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In each American jurisdiction there is a governmental officer
who bears the label, derived from the common law, of "attorney
general." The lineage of the modern attorney general in the United
States extends back to the similarly denominated legal officers of the
American colonial period and, ultimately, to the attorney general of
England, since the attorney general concept was among the elements
of the English common law adopted by the colonists. With a single
exception,1 the colonial legislatures eschewed any attempts at precise
delineation of the powers and duties of their attorneys general.
Rather, description of a colonial attorney general's role was left to
custom and common law, and the colonial law officers were typically
ascribed the same functions that had devolved upon their English
precursors.! At the time of the American Revolution the common law
attorney general was rather broadly acknowledged as the appropriate
officer to commence and pursue any legal action that might justifia-
bly be undertaken by the sovereign.'
* Assistant Attorneys General, State of Ohio. The views expressed herein are shared by
the authors, but do not necessarily reflect the posture of the Office of the Attorney General.
I Only in Rhode Island was there a statute detailing the attributes of the attorney general.
Key, The Legal Work of the Federal Government, 25 VA. L. REV. 165, 169 n.16 (1938). There
was an attorney general in each of the American colonies. Kramer and Siegel, The Attorney
General of England and the Attorney General of the United States, 1960 DuKE L.J. 524, 525.
2 See Cooley, Predecessors of the Federal Attorney General: The Attorney General in
England and the American Colonies, 2 AM. 3. LEGAL HIsT. 304, 309 (1958). The various
colonial attorneys general rendered mixed performances, inspiring both acerbic criticism and
high praise. See H. CUMMINGS AND C. MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE 9-12 (1937). Following
the attainment of independence, each of the United States except Connecticut preserved the
office of attorney general. Cooley, supra, at 311.
The common-law attorney general concept evolved over several centuries, during which
the attorney general of England absorbed steadily increasing power and prestige, finally becom-
ing the "chief law officer of the crown." See J. EDWARDS, THE LAW OFFICERS OF THE CROWN
12-31 (1964); T. PLUCKNETr, CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 228-30 (5th ed. 1956);
R. POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 111-18 (1953). The attorney
general had established his supremacy among English law officers by the end of the seventeenth
century, and
at the time of the birth of the American Union, the experience of centuries, both in
England and in the Colonies, had demonstrated the need for the centralization of
the conduct of the sovereign's law business in one officer, known as an Attorney
General, if the interests of the sovereign were to be adequately and efficiently served.
So it was also that at that time the very title of "Attorney General" had been
recognized to carry with it complete and exclusive power over all legal affairs of the
Government, an authority that no one save the sovereign himself could question.
Key, supra note 1, at 173.
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Although there exists no comprehensive enumeration of the
common law powers and duties of the eighteenth century attorney
general, it is nonetheless possible to cull from English writings of the
period some insight regarding particular circumstances in which at-
torney general action was readily accepted. In addition to his consult-
ative role as the state's legal adviser, the eighteenth century attorney
general engaged in both criminal and civil litigation. With respect to
criminal matters, it is at least clear that the attorney general was
empowered to commence prosecutions in certain situations.' In the
arena of civil litigation, the common law attorney general played a
dual role, both championing the proprietary and pecuniary interests
of the government itself' and contesting infringements of the rights
of the general public via the doctrine of parens patriae6 Thus the
I For example, the attorney general could file informations with King's Bench to redress
"such enormous misdemeanors as peculiarly tend to disturb or endanger [the king's] govern-
ment." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 308 (Wendell ed. 1856).
Although prosecutions for mundane criminal activity were typically left in the hands of private
individuals throughout much of the English history, see generally Note, The District Attor-
ney-A Historical Puzzle, 1952 Wis L. REV. 125, the attorney general seemingly possessed
vast, seldom-used authority in this area. See J. EDWARDS, THE LAW OFFICERS OF THE CROWN
13-14 (1964); Van Alstyne and Roberts, The Powers of the Attorney General in Wisconsin.
1974 Wis. L. REV. 721, 726; Note, Attorney General-Common Law Power over Criminal
Prosecutions and Civil Litigation of the State, 16 N.C.L. REV. 282, 284 (1938). The level of
attorney general criminal prosecutorial activity was much greater in the colonies. H. CUMMINGS
& C. MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE 13 (1937).
' As the representative of the crown itself, the attorney general could exploit all ordinary
avenues of legal redress in order to collect revenues and to otherwise protect crown property
from misappropriation or abuse. Furthermore, stemming from the medieval perception of the
king as "praerogative," see Holdsworth, The Early History of the A ttorney and Solicitor
General. 13 ILL. L. REV. 602, 612 (1919), the attorney general could avail himself of exceptional
litigation privileges. The attorney general was the recipient of "superior standing" in the courts.
Cooley, supra note 2, at 305. He could, moreover, employ a variety of extraordinary writs. The
attorney general could proceed by information in rem to acquire for the Crown title to seized
or unclaimed chattels. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND,
262-63 (Wendell ed. 1856); J. CHITrY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE PREROGATIVES OF THE
CROWN AND THE RELATIVE DUTIES AND RIGHTS OF THE SUBJECT 332-36 (1820). He could
initiate an "inquest of office" to recover any type of property on behalf of the sovereign. See
J. CHiTTY, supra, at 246-61. Additionally, the attorney general might use the writ ofscirefacias
to seek revocation of grants improvidently made by the Crown, id. at 330-31, or invoke the
writ of quo warranto to challenge the usurpation or misuse of any charter or office. See 3 W.
BLACKSTONE, supra at 263; J. CHITTY, supra, at 336-38.
6 The common-law attorney general's stewardship of the public interest, accomplished
through the ancient office of the monarch as "pater familias of the kingdom," see 3 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 220 (Wendell ed. 1856), centered
upon the curtailment of public nuisances and the enforcement of charities. In the absence of
unusual circumstances, the existence of a common nuisance would generate no right of legal
action in the hands of those individuals thereby affected. Id. at 219. Rather, the collective injury
produced a single cognizable legal claim that only the Crown as parens patriae might assert.
Hence it was incumbent upon the attorney general to contest activities injurious to the public.
See id. at 220; 4 id. at 167. Likewise, since eleemosynary dispositions inure to the benefit of
the public generally, it was the attorney general, the chief law officer of theparens patriae, who
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incidents of attorney generalship, as evidenced by the common law
and custom of eighteenth century England and the American colo-
nies, were quite extensive.
The office of attorney general of Ohio has existed for one
hundred thirty years, and except for the first five has been established
as a constitutional position. However, Ohio's constitution is virtually
devoid of direct explication of the functions to be undertaken by the
attorney general,7 and Ohio's early attorneys general played a very
limited role in the conduct of state government, confining their activi-
ties mainly to giving rather perfunctory legal advice and prosecuting
and collecting state claims.' It is the thesis of this article that Ohio's
attorney general possesses a greater range of powers and duties than
has usually been recognized by the men elected to that office. More
specifically, it is the contention of this article that the charter of
Ohio's attorney general is comprised of the fundamental characteris-
tics of the common law attorney general concept-the status of "chief
law officer" and its incidental attributes-and that these traditional
qualities inhere in the office of the attorney general of Ohio by virtue
of its constitutional origin. Some commentators have posited that the
attorney general serves, within constraints imposed by the General
Assembly, as little more than an assistant to Ohio's Governor.9 This
view may derive superficial support from a wooden reading of Ohio's
constitution and certainly accords with the actual performance of
most Ohio attorneys general. It is submitted, however, that this view
does not comport with a principled analysis of the office in light of
Ohio constitutional history.
alone was permitted to maintain "an information in the Court of Chancery to have the charity
properly established." 3 id. at 427. See J. CHITTY, supra note 5, at 161-62. See also J. ED-
WARDS, THE LAW OFFICERS OF THE CROWN 286 (1964).
'See OHIO CONST. art. 111, §§ 1-21.
During the period 1846-1900, several thousand opinions were issued by Ohio's attorneys
general, but the overwhelming majority of these opinions were merely very short letters of
advice without citation to any legal authorities. See generally 1-4 OFFICIAL OPINIONS OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF OHIO (W. Ellis ed. 1905). Cursory examination of the
annual and biennial reports of Ohio's nineteenth century attorneys general discloses that the
litigative activity of these officers was usually slight.
It has been asserted that the attorney general's foremost function is that of "principal
legal advisor to the governor" and that, concomitantly, "the attorney general does not make
public policy which is subject to voter approval or rejection." W. HEISEL AND 1. HESSLER,
STATE GOVERNMENT FOR OUR TIMES: NEW LOOK AT OHIO'S CONSTITUTION 71 (1970).
Another writer declared that Ohio's attorney generalship is, at least "largely," a "ministerial
administrative" post. Walker, The Executive Department in Ohio, in AN ANALYSIS AND AP-
PRAISAL OF THE OHIO STATE CONSTITUTION 1851-1951, at 36 (H. Walker ed. 1951). It was
suggested in both these studies that gubernatorial appointment is the preferable method of
selecting Ohio's attorney general. The office of attorney general is, of course, elective in Ohio.
See OHIO CONST. art. III, § 1.
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I. CREATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL IN OHIO
Ohio's attorney general is "chief law officer for the state and all
of its departments."10 In consonance with the prevailing circumstance
in the United States, the attorney general is a constitutional executive
officer in Ohio. Unlike the majority of states, however, Ohio did not
establish the office of attorney general concurrently with or soon
after the attainment of its statehood in 1803.
The first constitution of Ohio, which was adopted in November
of 1802" and remained in force until supplanted by Ohio's present
constitution in 1851, contained no authorization for an attorney
general or kindred legal officer on any level of state government.
2
The sparse records of the framers' deliberations13 do not indicate
whether the creation of the office of attorney general was pondered
during the brief constitutional convention. Thus Ohio was without a
legal officer possessing statewide authority for over four decades.
In 1846, the General Assembly passed "An Act to create the
office of Attorney General, and to prescribe his duties,"' 4 which pro-
vided for the election by both houses of the general assembly of an
attorney general who would hold office for a term of five years and
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.02 (Page 1969).
' Congress enacted legislation "to enable the people of... [Ohio] to form a constitution
and state government, and for admission of such state into the Union, on an equal footing with
the original States." Act of April 30, 1802, ch. XL, 2 Stat. 173. Delegates from throughout
Ohio convened at Chillicothe on November 1, 1802, and, being "expeditious in its work," the
convention adjourned a mere four weeks later. Watson, The Early Judicary, Early Laws and
Bar of Ohio, in 3 OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL SOCIETY PUBLICATIONS 141, 151
(1891). The delegates decided against submitting their work to the electorate. JOURNAL OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 15-16 (1802). Instead, the constitution "was adopted by the
convention and went into effect at once." Ryan, From Charter to Constitution: Introduction,
in 5 OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL SOCIETY PUBLICATIONS vii, xiii (1897). See
JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 45 (1802).
12 The executive article of the 1802 constitution, article II, conferred the state's "supreme
executive power" upon the Governor in section I and thereafter detailed his authority. Section
16 of article II provided for appointment of a secretary of state by the General Assembly.
Article VI provided for appointment of additional "civil officers" who would today be included
within the executive branch of state government, such as the state treasurer and auditor. OHIO
CONST. OF 1802 art. VI, § 2. The only county civil offices expressly created were those of sheriff
and coroner. Id. art. VI, § 1. The term "attorney general" did, however, appear in the text of
the constitution: it was stipulated that an "attorney general" was among the persons ineligible
for membership in the General Assembly. Id. art. I, § 26. Presumably, the framers therein had
reference to attorneys general of the other states and the federal government.
13 The only extant official account of the convention is the JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONVENTION (1802). Containing a mere forty-six pages, it reports only the barest
outline of the convention proceedings. The journal reflects the delegates' voting activities with
regard to a variety of matters, but it features no information concerning the substance of the
convention debates. The Journal is reproduced in Ryan, From Charter to Constitution, in 5
OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL SOCIETY PUBLICATIONS, 80-132 (1879).
24 44 Ohio Laws 45 (1846).
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described a variety of functions attendant to the new office.'5 The
attorney general was charged with substantial responsibility for rep-
resenting the interests of the state in court," and was instructed to
"give legal opinions" to certain state officials "when required ther-
eto."' 7 The General Assembly also required that the attorney general
institute litigation in specified circumstances," and stated that he
could enlist the aid of county prosecutors in such endeavors." Finally,
the newly created official was assigned various administrative duties",
and was afforded several procedural prerogatives. 21 Thus the duties
whose discharge was imposed upon this statutory officer substantially
coincided with the traditional functions of common-law attorneys
general. However, the language of the statute was mandatory in
form, facially reserving scant room for discretionary attorney general
action.22 Although the authority vested in the position by the General
Assembly was never subjected to judicial assay, Henry Stanbery, the
only person to hold office pursuant to the 1856 legislation, seemingly
viewed his post as a ministerial one.?
" Id. § 1.
' The enactment mandated that the attorney general "appear for the state" in all cases
tried or argued "in the supreme court in bank" and in which the state was a party or was
interested. Id. § 3. The legislation also commanded that he appear "in any court or tribunal"
in similar litigation "when required by the governor, or either branch of the legislature." Id. §
4.
,7 Id. § 7.
" See id. § 5 (prosecute certain indictable offenses "at the request of the governor, secre-
tary, auditor, or treasurer"), § 6 (prosecute official bonds of delinquent officeholders), § 8
(initiate quo warranto proceeding "[ulpon complaint made to him" that a corporation has acted
illegally), § 9 (initiate quo warranto proceedings on the basis of his own knowledge or when so
directed by the supreme court or the General Assembly), § 10 (prosecute delinquencies of state
revenue personnel).
"1 Id. § 12. The attorney general was also assigned the duty of furnishing advice to the
prosecuting attorneys on request. Id. § 13.
" See id. § 14 (compilation of crime statistics annually submitted by the various prosecut-
ing attorneys), § 15 (maintenance of certain records), § 16 (submission of yearly report to the
legislature).
21 See id. §§ 18, 19, 20.
n All provisions of the Act relating to the functions of the office created therein were
couched in compulsory terminology, declaring that the attorney general "shall" perform, id.
§§ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 15, 16, or that it "shall be his duty" to perform, d. §§ 8, 9, 10, 11, 13. Moreover,
litigative action or dissemination of legal advice by the attorney general was largely to be
predicated by requests emanating from some other government official or institution. See id.
§§4, 5, 7, 9, I1, 13. But see id. §§ 3, 6, 10.
" A perusal of Mr. Stanbery's depiction of his conduct conveys the impression that he
perceived the bounds of his authority to be stringently described by statute so that he possessed
virtually no discretionary latitude with respect to the initiation of action. See generally 1846
ANNUAL REP. OF THE Arr'Y GEN.; 1847 ANNUAL REP. OF THE Att'Y GEN.; 1849 ANNUAL REP.
OF THE ATr'Y GEN.; 1850 ANNUAL REP. OF THE A-r'y GEN. The 1846 attorney general
legislation was twice amended, but these legislative alterations did not include any significant
additions to the attorney general's powers and duties. See Act of Feb. 24, 1848,46 Ohio Laws
94; Act of March 19, 1849, 47 Ohio Laws 55.
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The constitution of 1851 wrought significant changes in the com-
position of the executive department of Ohio's government. Among
other changes the framers of the 1851 constitution included within the
executive department a state attorney general: "The Executive De-
partment shall consist of a governor, lieutenant governor, secretary
of state, auditor, treasurer and attorney general ... ."I' Unlike the
provisions concerning the Governor and Lieutenant Governor, 25 how-
ever, the text of article III did not expressly ascribe any powers and
duties to the attorney general. 2 The framers merely provided for the
election of an attorney general, specified his term in office and man-
dated that the several executive officers "receive, for their services, a
compensation to be established by law." 27 Moreover, the written ac-
count of the convention proceedings does not shed appreciable light
upon the delegates' individual or collective cogitation regarding the
inclusion of the office of attorney general in the constitution. As
respects the authority of the attorney general, article III of the consti-
tution of 1851 has not been materially altered since its promulga-
tion, 2  although the functioning of the attorney general has been an
intermittent focus of legislative attention."0
24 OHIO CONST. OF 1851 art. III, § 1.
23 The framers conferred upon the Governor essentially the same characteristics accorded
that officer under the constitution of 1802. See id. §§ 5-11. The function of the newly-created
office of Lieutenant Governor, though quite narrow, was also textually described. Id. §§ 15,
16.
28 Technically, the framers did specify two functions of the attorney general. In common
with the other executive officers, the attorney general was given the obligation to supply the
Governor with requested information "upon any subject relating to the duties" of the attorney
general. Id. § 6. Additionally, each officer of the executive branch was required to periodically
report to the General Assembly via the Governor. Id. § 20.
2 Id. § 19.
2' The committee of the whole engaged in no recorded discussion concerning either the
prudence of constitutionally establishing the office or the factors that caused them to do so.
Any such deliberation likely transpired within the committee of the executive, whose internal
work apparently was not reported. Indeed, there was exceedingly little discourse among the
committee of the whole regarding the composition of the executive article. Most of the discus-
sion in this vein dealt with grammatical or relatively trivial substantive issues. See 2 REPORT
OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO 1850-51, at 287-91, 349, 756, 834-35 (1951). There was a
divergence of opinion with respect to the creation of the office of Lieutenant Governor. See id.
at 331-33. However, there was no kindred dispute within the committee of the whole concerning
the office of attorney general.
27 The term of office of the attorney general, which was two years pursuant to OHIO
CONST. OF 1851 art. III, § 2, is now four years. See OHIO CONST. art. Ill, § 2. Otherwise, the
constitutional provisions bearing upon the attorney general's functions remain substantively
unchanged from their original character. See id. §§ 1, 6, 19, 20.
1 The General Assembly first addressed the matter in the spring of 1852, enacting "An
Act to prescribe the duties of the Attorney General," 50 Ohio Laws 267 (1852). For an
assessment of current statutes relating to the attorney general, see notes 128-50 infra and
accompanying text.
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II. THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL POWER
UNDER ARTICLE III OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION
Either of two conclusions is inferable from the vacuity of the
language employed in the 1851 constitution to create the office of the
attorney general: the framers either believed the bare term "attorney
general" to be sufficiently descriptive to render superfluous any fur-
ther elaboration of the character of the officer given that designation
or, quite the contrary, they wished that the attorney general consti-
tute a lifeless shell until his position was legislatively infused with
substantive content. A review of relevant Ohio political history and
an application of pertinent principles of constitutional interpretation
reveal that only the former inference may be acceptably drawn, and
that Ohio's attorney general is constitutionally granted the basic
traits of the common law attorney general.
A. The Creation of the Office of Attorney General Placed in
Historical Perspective.
Ohio is similar to several other states in which the office of
attorney general was statutorily originated prior to its recognition in
the state constitution. In one of those other jurisdictions, New Mex-
ico, the state supreme court has firmly adhered to the view that
because creation of the office of attorney general was initially accom-
plished legislatively in that state, the subsequent mention of the office
in the state constitution was an essentially meaningless exercise. That
court stated in State v. Davidson that the doctrine of implied
common-law powers in the attorney general "is based entirely upon
the initial premise that the Attorney General was recognized as being
vested with common-law powers before any attempt was made to
enumerate or define his powers by statute.""1 The court then deter-
mined that, rather than the traditional common law attorney general
concept, it was the character of the preexisting statutorily described
office which the drafters of New Mexico's constitution had intended
to incorporate in their usage of the term "attorney general." Accord-
ingly, the court held that the attorney general of that state could
operate only within the ambit of legislative directives."2 Although the
3' 33 N.M. 664, 668, 275 P. 373, 375 (1929).
After noting that the statutory creation of the office of attorney general transpired
"long prior to the adoption of the common law in this jurisdiction," id. at 668, 275 P. at 375,
the court concluded:
It will thus be seen that the office of Attorney General in New Mexico was created
by statute, and its powers and duties defined and limited by statute from its inception.
We therefore hold that the doctrine upon which the state relies is inapplicable here,
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rationale and holding of State v. Davidson have been persuasively
criticized by differing authorities as being either too narrow33 or
overly broad,34 the decision was expressly affirmed in the much more
recent case of State v. Reese. 5 Since the history of the office of
attorney general in Ohio is, in its barest rudiments, akin to the sequ-
ence of events which led the Davidson and Reese courts to determine
that the New Mexico attorney general is a creature of statutory
proportions only, it might be suggested that the Davidson doctrine
should be applied in Ohio. It is hence germane to examine more
closely the circumstances that attended the inclusion of the attorney
general in article III of the 1851 Constitution of Ohio.
Of course, the scope of the attorney general's charter ultimately
rests upon the intent of the framers of the constitution of 1851 in
organically establishing that officer as a member of the executive
branch of state government. Although, as noted, the journals of the
constitutional convention fail to directly illumine that intent, the con-
vention records and the tenor of the constitution itself do reveal an
unmistakable predilection among the convention delegates for en-
hancing the authority of the executive and, to a lesser extent, judicial
departments at the expense of the legislature. The prevalence of this
attitude in the middle of the nineteenth century among the framers,
as well as the citizenry as a whole, is readily understandable when
assessed in the context of prior experience with government in Ohio.
Moreover, consideration of the governmental history of Ohio preced-
ing 1850 casts some light upon the likely motivation for the constitu-
tional establishment of the office of attorney general at that juncture.
The environs that became the State of Ohio in 1803 were pre-
viously a portion of the Northwest Territory. Congress had enacted
the Ordinance of 178736 to ensure the maintenance of order in the
and that no common-law powers were confirmed in the office of Attorney General
by our Constitution.
Id. at 668-69, 275 P. at 375.
33 See DeLong, Powers and Duties of the State Attorney-General in Criminal
Prosecutions, 25 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 358, 370 (1934).
1 See Sheppard, Common Law Powers and Duties of the Attorney General. 7 BAYLOR
L. REV. 1, 3 & n.7 (1955).
78 N.M. 241, 430 P.2d 399 (1967). The Supreme Court of New Mexico subsequently
reiterated that the attorney general of that state does not enjoy inherent common-law au-
thority in State ex rel. Norwell v. Credit Bureau of Albuquerque, Inc., 85 N.M. 521, 524,
514 P.2d 40, 43 (1973). The Reese court purported to thoroughly review the question of state
attorney general authority but revealingly added, perhaps with more candor than wisdom, that
"[elven if it appeared to us that [the Davidson court had been] mistaken or misled, we would
hesitate to overturn a decision so far-reaching in its implications which has gone unchallenged
for almost forty years." 78 N.M. at 248, 430 P.2d at 406.
u An ordinance for the government of the United States northwest of the river Ohio, July
13, 1787, 4 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS 752 (1823). Enacted by the Continental Congress operat-
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Territory until three to five territorial segments would become eligi-
ble for statehood. In addition to securing several fundamental rights
for inhabitants, the Ordinance of 1787 made provision for a terri-
torial government. Congress was to appoint a governor, a secretary
and "a court, to consist of three judges, any two of whom to form a
court, who shall have a common law jurisdiction. ' ' 3 While the Ordi-
nance granted the secretary only ministerial duties, it conferred ex-
ceedingly broad authority upon the judges and the governor, espe-
cially the latter.38
The vast powers devolving upon the territorial governor were
wielded to their utmost extent by the man Congress appointed to fill
that post, the autocratic Arthur St. Clair.39 Governor St. Clair, a
Revolutionary War general, zealously seized every opportunity to
exert control over the government of the territory, and continually
subverted the will of the General Assembly through the exercise of
his absolute veto power." Both the person of St. Clair and the office
of governor as an institution became objects of revulsion and distrust
among the citizenry," and this widespread discontent was amply
ing under the Articles of Confederation, the Ordinance had a profound impact upon the course
of westward expansion in the United States. See D. RYAN, HISTORY OF OHIO 26-27 (1888).
For a fine brief account of the events leading up to Ohio's attainment of statehood, including
the effect of the Ordinance of 1787, see S. Chase, A Preliminary Sketch of the History of Ohio,
in I STATUTES OF OHIO 2 (1833). Citations to the Ordinance herein are to its text as reproduced
in I M. CURWEN, REVISED STATUTES OF OHIO 86-92 (1853).
'7 I M. CURWEN, REVISED STATUTES OF OHIO 87 (1853).
11 Under the terms of the ordinance of 1787, the period of transition from territorial
status to eventual statehood was bifurcated. During the initial stage, the judges and Governor,
acting in concert with majority rule, were empowered to adopt "such laws of the original states,
criminal and civil, as may be necessary, and best suited to the circumstances of the district."
The Governor was also to "appoint such magistrates and other civil officers . . . as he shall
find necessary." The second phase of the territorial government was to commence with the
election of a General Assembly when the territory achieved a population of "five thousand free
male inhabitants, of full age." Thereafter, the lawmaking power was to jointly reside in the
hands of the house of representatives, a legislative council composed of five persons selected
from the membership of the house and the Governor. The Governor could "convene, prorogue
and dissolve the general assembly, when, in his opinion, it shall be expedient." More impor-
tantly, Congress provided that "no bill or legislative act whatever, shall be of any force without
his assent," thus supplying the Governor with the prerogative of insuperable veto. Id. at 87-89.
11 Even a later St. Clair apologist, prefatory to an extended encomium to the territorial
Governor, was constrained to admit that the central figure in his essay was "unfortunately...
arbitrary and unyielding to a degree and rarely conceded an opinion when deliberately formed."
Gholson, Ohio's First Election and the Campaign Preceding It. 4 OHIO L. REP. 413,415 (1906).
Among the charges levelled against St. Clair by his many detractors was that the Governor
was an "aristocrat." Id. at 416. One of the territorial judges, labelling St. Clair a "despot,"
remonstrated that the Governor was "at war with those who do not approach him with adula-
tion on their tongue." Letter from John Cleves Symmes to Thomas Jefferson, January 23, 1802,
in 3 C. CARTER, TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES 205 (1934).
11 See Gholson, supra note 39, at 415-16; 3 E. RANDALL AND D. RYAN, HISTORY OF OHIO:
THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF AN AMERICAN STATE 81 (1912).
"1 See Gholson, supra note 39, at 414-27; D. RYAN, HISTORY OF OHIO 41-57 (1888); C.
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manifested when Ohio became the first state from the Northwest
Territory to gain admission to the federal union.
When the first constitutional convention began in 1802, the dele-
gates, reflecting the sentiments of the general population, were over-
whelmingly opposed to St. Clair" and predisposed to prevent any
possibility that the gubernatorial hegemony which had permeated the
territorial experience could be duplicated in the government of the
new state. Overreacting to their fear of a strong executive, the fra-
mers outlined a scheme of government in which the legislature was
omnipotent and the governorship was reduced to merely nominal
importance-a "name almost without meaning."43  The General
Assembly was accorded the privilege of choosing, or at least specify-
ing the manner of selecting, persons to occupy virtually all significant
government positions."
The residence of such extreme power in the province of the
General Assembly was later regretted, and by mid-century there was
pervasive recognition of a need for balance among the three depart-
ments of state government. Therefore, the framers of the constitution
of 1851 accorded enhanced authority to the executive branch. The
power of the Governor was supplemented in some respects4 5 but
WALKER, OHIO COMPANY SETTLEMENTS IN OHIO TO 1868, at 141-42 (0. Morrison ed. 1967):
Woodbridge, A History of Separation of Powers in Ohio: A Study in Administrative Law, 13
U. CIN. L. REV. 191, 206 (1939).
" Of the thirty-five delegates to the convention, twenty-six were confirmed Jeffersonian
republicans and hence opponents of St. Clair. See Letter from Thomas Worthington to Thomas
Jefferson, November 8, 1802, in 3 C. CARTER, TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES
254 (1934). The general antipathy of the delegates toward the Governor is most tellingly
depicted by their response to his appearance at the convention. Predictably, St. Clair attemped
to superintend the assemblage in his official capacity. This overture was speedily rebuffed by
the delegates. A slight majorty of the delegates eventually did authorize St. Clair to address
the convention. See JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 8 (1802). However, even
this lowly courtesy was granted only after, in the words of one delegate, the territorial governor
"again appeared & beged [sic] leave not as a public officer, but as a private Citizen to make a
few observations." Letter from John Smith to Thomas Jefferson, November 9, 1802, in 3 C.
CARTER, TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES 255 (1934).
0 Walker, The Executive Department in Ohio, in AN ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF THE
OHIO STATE CONSTITUTION 1851-1951, at 35 (H. Walker ed. 1951). See Gholson, supra note
39, at 426; W. HEISEL AND I. HESSLER, STATE GOVERNMENT FOR OUR TIMES - NEW LOOK AT
OHIO'S CONSTITUTION 68-69 (1970); Woodbridge, supra note 41, at 217.
" See OHIO CONST. OF 1802 art. II, § 16 ("Secretary of State shall be appointed by a
joint ballot of the Senate and House of Representatives"); art. III, § 8 (judges of constitutional
courts "shall be appointed by a joint ballot of both houses of the General Assembly"); art. Ill,
§ I (legislature may establish additional courts); art. V, § 5 (uppermost ranking militia officers
appointed by joint ballot of both houses); art. VI, § 2 (state treasurer and auditor appointed by
legislature); art. VI, § 4 (other "civil officers" appointed "in such manner as may be directed
by law").
0 The textual exposition of the Governor's authority was not altered appreciably. The
pardoning power of the Governor was expanded to encompass "reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, for all crimes and offenses except treason and cases of impeachment, upon such
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lingering wariness of excessive concentration of authority in that off-
ice prevented the approval of a gubernatorial veto power." Thus the
framers of the 1851 constitution desired both to curb the then-existing
surfeit of legislative strength" and to simultaneously preclude a re-
currence of the problems engendered by the overly powerful gover-
norship under the Ordinance of 1787. It is plausible that in this
atmosphere the framers sought to augment the power of the execu-
tive branch generally without correspondingly contributing to the
authority of the governor. The creation of an attorney general who
is neither directly accountable to nor totally dependent upon the
Governor or the General Assemby is a logical measure for achieve-
ment of the type of interdepartmental balance desired.
Accordingly, the rationale advanced in Davidson and followed
in Reese, whatever its analytical vitality in New Mexico, is hardly
compatible with the governmental history of Ohio. The attributes of
the article III attorney general were not meant to be coterminous
with the powers and duties of the Attorney General created by the
General Assembly in 1846. Indeed, it appears that, in accordance
with the principle that inconsistent preexisting legislation is abro-
gated by the adoption of a new constitution,48 the 1846 attorney
general act ceased to be law in 1851.11 Hence the lessons of history
conditions as he may think proper." OHIO CONST. art. Ill, § I. Otherwise, the express power
of the Governor remained essentially unchanged. Compare OHIO CONST. OF 1851 art. Ill. .
5-10, with OHIO CONST. OF 1802 art. II, §§ 1, 4, 7, 9-11. Nevertheless, the framers desired that
Ohio should have an "active Governor." See I DEBATES OFTHE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
OF 1850-51, at 175 (1851). This goal was to be accomplished indirectly, however, by liberating
the state government from the domination of the General Assembly. See note 47 infra.
" See Woodbridge, supra note 41, at 218-20.
" One convention delegate voiced the prevailing philosophy as follows:
Under the old Constitution, the legislature swallowed up the rest of the government.
They constituted not only the Legislature, but the Executive and Judiciary to some
extent . . . .[Bly confining the Legislature to their appropriate law making func-
tions, we shall have accomplished everything the people have asked for; that is, we
shall have established a just equilibrium ...thus restoring the harmony that has
been so long disturbed under the old Constitution, in all the different departments
of government.
I DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1850-51, at 175 (1851). See id. at 123.
The framers accordingly stripped the General Assembly of much of the authority which that
body could wield under the constitution of 1802, particularly its powers, mentioned in note 44
supra, concerning the other officers of state government. For an excellent concise review of the
reforms implemented by the framers of the constitution of 1851, see Woodbridge, supra note
41, at 217-24.
" OHIO CONST. schedule, § I. See State v. Medberry, 7 Ohio St. 522 (1857); Cass v. Dillon,
2 Ohio St. 607 (1853).
" It is evident from the enactment of the 1852 statute prescribing the attorney general's
duties, see note 30 supra, that the 1846 attorney general legislation did not survive the effectua-
tion of the constitution of 1851. The 1846 Act was amended on two occasions, with each
amendment specifying in its title that it had reference to the 1846 legislation. See Act of Feb.
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persuasively, albeit circumstantially; commend the view that the fra-
mers of the constitution of 1851 created an attorney general who is
immune from the seasonal whims of the legislature-in essence, a
common-law attorney general. 5
B. The Applicability of English Common Law Principles in Ohio
In the decisions of other American jurisdictions, recognition of
the viability of English common law principles within a state has
typically been a signal constituent of the process of judicial determi-
nation that the attorney general of that state may, at least in the
absence of legislative withdrawal of that power, invoke the full mea-
sure of authority enjoyed by his English progenitors.5' A number of
states have, by express legislation, incorporated into their own com-
pendia of legal rules the common law and related statutes of England
as they prevailed at some particular point in history. Such statutory
reception of English common law has often been accentuated during
the course of judicial explication of state attorney general authority,
usually leading a court to conclude that the attorney general in its
state is vested with the entire complement of traditional-extra-
statutory powers and duties, at least in the absence of explicit legisla-
tive abrogation. 5
24, 1848, 46 Ohio Laws 94, Act of March 19, 1849, 47 Ohio Laws 55. The title of the 1852
legislation gave no indication that it was enacted to supplement, modify or repeal the 1846
statute. See An Act to prescribe the duties of the Attorney General, May I, 1852, 50 Ohio Laws
267. Moreover, the 1852 Act duplicated the 1846 legislation in some of its particulars. Compare
id. §§ 3-7, 9-1I, 15-18, with 1846 Act §§ 3-1I, 13, 44 Ohio Laws 45 (1846). Thus, much of the
former statute would have been superfluous had the latter persisted beyond the adoption of the
new constitution. Therefore, since (1) the 1846 Act was not expressly repealed and (2) it was
apparently no longer operative in 1852, it is logical to surmise that it was abrogated in 1851
by virtue of its inconsistency with article III of the constitution of 1851. This being the case, it
would seem clear that the 1846 attorney general legislation did not serve as the model for the
article III attorney general.
- There is yet another fundamental reason for the inappropriateness of the Davidson-
Reese rule in Ohio. In New Mexico, the office of district attorney is a constitutional position.
Indeed, the New Mexico constitution designates the district attorney "the law officer of the
state." State v. Reese, 78 N.M. 241, 247,430 P.2d 399,405 (1967) (citing NEw MExIco CONsT.
art. VI, § 24). The exalted status of the district attorney was one determinant of the Reese
court's holding that the New Mexico attorney general can act only pursuant to statutory
authorization. In Ohio, the attorney general is the sole constitutional governmental law officer.
Although there is a prosecuting attorney in each Ohio county, prosecuting attorneys are offi-
cials of only local and purely statutory power. See notes 151-67 infra and accompanying text.
"' See, e.g., Fergus v. Russel, 270 III. 304, 33.7, 110 N.E. 130, 143 (1915): State v. Finch,
128 Kans. 665, 671, 280 P. 910, 913 (1929).
2 See, e.g., State ex rel. Williams v. Karstan, 208 Ark. 703, 707, 187 S.W.2d 327, 329
(1945); State ex reL McKittrick v. Missouri Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 352 Mo. 29, 36, 175 S.W.2d
857, 861 (1943). An unusual twist was applied to this rationale in Commonwealth e.x rel.
Ferguson v. Gardner, 327 S.W.2d 947 (Ky. 1959). The Gardner court found that the attorney
general of Kentucky possessed common-law powers by virtue of that state's statutory adoption
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Although no such statutory reception of the English common
law has been in effect in Ohio since 1806, 53 judicial pronouncements
leave no doubt that the common law has always served as the rules
of decision within the state. In 1855 the supreme court summarized
of the English common law as it existed in 1607. However, the court held that the attorney
general could not intervene in a will contest because it was not demonstrated that, as of 1607,
the English attorney general was empowered to undertake such a maneuver. The court thus
embraced the common-law attorney general concept but did so in a quite wooden fashion,
virtually "freezing" the concept as it was constituted at the time of initial English colonization
of North America, and thereby eviscerating its salutary fluidity. In this respect Gardner is
something of an analogue to Fergus v. Russel, 270 III. 304, 110 N.E. 130 (1915). in which the
Illinois Supreme Court declared that state's attorney general to be constitutionally insulated
from any legislative impingement upon his common-law powers. It is submitted that "freezing"
the common-law attorney general concept nullifies its most prominent and historically most
valuable characteristic: the capacity for ready adaptability to incipient fluctuations in the need
for legal representation of the public interest. See Johnson v. Commonwealth ex rel. Meredith,
291 Ky. 829, 165 S.W.2d 820 (1942).
The existence of a statute legitimating the common law of England may also militate
against the possession by a state attorney general of inherent common-law powers. In New
Mexico the constitutional recognition of the office of attorney general preceded the enactment
of the reception statute. This sequence was noted by the court in State v. Reese, 78 N.M. 241.
430 P.2d 399 (1967), as a supplemental ground for its ratification of the Davidson holding that
the New Mexico attorney general may not invoke common-law powers.
" Among the laws adopted by Governor St. Clair and the territorial judges for applica-
tion within the Northwest Territory was a Virginia enactment that constituted as rules of
decision the common law of England and all English statutes of a general nature enacted prior
to 1607, the date of Virginia's colonization. Act of October 1, 1795, 1 S. CHASE, STATUTES OF
OHIo 190 (1833). This legislative adoption by the territorial government was apparently
recognized as retaining validity in Ohio notwithstanding the transition to statehood in 1803.
See Crawford v. Chapman, 17 Ohio 449, 452 (1849); Drake v. Rogers, 13 Ohio St. 21, 28
(1862). But cf. State ex rel. Donahey v. Edmonson, 89 Ohio St. 93, 105 N.E. 269 (1913)
(Ordinance of 1787 "entirely superseded" by the Ohio Constitution of 1802). At any rate, the
effectiveness of the Virginia reception statute in Ohio was explicitly preserved by the General
Assembly in 1805. See Act of February 14, 1805, in I S. CHASE, STATUTES OF OHIO 512 (1833).
The duration of this measure was quite brief, however, and the same body repealed it the
succeeding year. Act of January 2, 1806, 4 Ohio Laws 38. Since that time there has been
operative in Ohio no legislation that unequivocally and comprehensively embraces the common
law of England. But see OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1.11 (Page 1969). See also id. § 1.49 (D)
(Page Supp. 1975).
The intent which underlay the General Assembly's 1806 abrogation of the reception statute
defies conclusive ascertainment. It is nonetheless well established that the action did not effect
a wholesale repudiation of English common law as the cornerstone of Ohio jurisprudence. In
its 1849 decision in Crawford v. Chapman, 17 Ohio 449 (1849), the Supreme Court of Ohio
declared that the 1806 repeal of the reception statute vitiated the force of pre-1607 English
statutes in Ohio but did not expunge the principles of English common law from the corpus of
Ohio law. Thirteen years later, the court reiterated and clarified the position it had expressed
in Chapman, adding:
It does not, however, follow from these acts [the adoption and repeal of the reception
statute] of the legislature, that the common law of England is not in force in this
state. To the same extent,. . . if the act of 1795 had never been enacted, the common
law of England has doubtless continued to be recognized as the common law of this
state.
Drake v. Rogers, 13 Ohio St. 21, 29 (1862).
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the status of the English common law in Ohio in the following lan-
guage:
It has not been adopted by express legislative enactment. . . .Its
introduction here. . . was almost a matter of course, and its terms
and foundation principles have been so interwoven with our consti-
tution and laws, so blended with the remedies we afford, and so
consistently enforced by the courts, that its implied recognition by
the government and the people, may be fairly assumed; and if it
cannot be said to be in force as the common law of England, it may
not inaptly be termed the common law of Ohio.54
The court accordingly concluded: "The common law of England,
when not inconsistent with the genius and spirit of our own institu-
tions, and thus rendered inapplicable to our situation and circumstan-
ces, furnishes the rule of decision in the courts of this State.'" 5
In addition to providing substantive rules, the English common
law has been widely used in Ohio to furnish interpretive aid in the
construction and application of written law. It has often been held
that enactments of the General Assembly are to be construed consis-
tently with the common law,5" and that statutory terminology is to
be assayed in light of the meaning that the common law attached to
particular words.57 Indeed, so strong is Ohio's common law heritage
that the General Assembly has admonished that salient common law
principles and concepts be consulted for guidance in the judicial inter-
n' Cleveland, C. & C.R.R. v. Keary, 3 Ohio St. 201, 205 (1855).
Id. at syllabus paragraph 2. See Kerwhacker v. Cleveland, C. & C.R.R., 3 Ohio St. 172,
178 (1855); Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 387, 391 (1854); Lessee of Hall v. Ashby, 9 Ohio
96, 98 (1839); Sergeant v. Steinberger, 2 Ohio 305, 306 (1826); Lessee of Lindsley v. Coats, I
Ohio 243, 245 (1824). See also Fulton v. Stewart, 2 Ohio 216 (1825). Yet cases can be found
in which Ohio jurists openly rejected legal maxims developed in England. See Knapp v.
Thomas, 39 Ohio St. 377, 385 (1883); Kerwhacker v. Cleveland, C. & C. R.R., 3 Ohio St. 172.
179 (1855): Stilley v. Folger, 14 Ohio 610, 650 (1846); Fleming v. Donahoe, 5 Ohio 255 (1832);
Doe v. Gibson, 2 Ohio 339 (1826); Sergeant v. Steinberger, 2 Ohio 305 (1826): Lessee of
Lindsley v. Coats, I Ohio 243 (1824). These few instances were predicated on the impertinence
of particular principles of English common law to circumstances indigenous to Ohio.
11 See Miller v. Fairley, 141 Ohio St. 327, 333-34, 48 N.E.2d 217, 222 (1943); City of
Wooster v. Arbenz, 116 Ohio St. 281, 287, 156 N.E. 210, 212 (1927); Chilcote v. Hoffman, 97
Ohio St. 98, 101-02, 119 N.E. 364, 365 (1918); State ex rel. Morris v. Sullivan, 81 Ohio St.
79, 95-96, 90 N.E. 146, 149-50 (1909).
"' See, e.g., Smith v. Buck, 119 Ohio St. 101, 102-08, 162 N.E. 382, 382-84 (1928): State
ex rel. Nead v. Nolte, I I I Ohio St. 486, 491, 146 N.E. 51, 52-53 (1924). The supreme court
voiced its belief in the worth of the common law as an aid in the construction of statutes at an
early date, saying:
[W]e must look to the common law, for we have no other guide. Can it be said, then,
that the common law is not in force, when without its aid and sanction, justice cannot
be administered; when even the written laws cannot be construed, explained and
enforced, without the common law, which furnishes the rules and principle of such
construction?
Ohio v. Lafferty, Tappan, 81, 82 (1817).
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pretation of its enactments." More importantly, the supreme court
in State v. Wing acknowleged that Ohio's constitution was "adopted
with a recognition of established contemporaneous common law prin-
ciples, and. . . did not repudiate, but cherished the established com-
mon law."5 Thus it quite cogently appears that the common law was
of sufficient strength and clarity in Ohio in 1852 that the framers of
the constitution, by employing the traditional Anglo-American title
for the chief law officer of the sovereign, meant to and did establish
an attorney general of broad inherent power.
This conclusion is reinforced by supreme court decisions deter-
mining the extent of powers possessed by other constitutionally cre-
ated state officers and bodies with common-law analogues. For ex-
ample, the supreme court in State ex rel. Doerfler v. Price"0 declared
that the term "grand jury" in Ohio's constitution carries the same
signification that it possessed under the common law."' Similarly,
Ohio courts have often turned to the common law for ascertainment
of the scope of authority bestowed upon them through the constitu-
tional allocation of "judicial power" to the courts.12
" See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1.49(D) (Page Supp. 1975). See also id. § 1.11 (Page 1969).
51 State v. Wing, 66 Ohio St. 407, 420, 64 N.E. 514, 516 (1902). See Summons v. State, 5
Ohio St. 325, 341 (1855).
" 101 Ohio St. 50, 128 N.E. 173 (1920).
I Id. at 54, 128 N.E. at 174. The Supreme Court of Ohio employed the same reasoning
in determining the signification of the term "jury" as used for the United States Constitution:
"The jury system ...was so well established that the framers of the Constitution did not
deem it necessary to define it, but recognized it as an institution, and made reference to it by
name only,. . . as it then existed at common law." Schwindt v. Graeff, 109 Ohio St. 404,405-
06, 142 N.E. 736, 736 (1942).
11 Ohio's constitution grants the state's "judicial power" to the various courts established
therein and such other courts that might be created by the General Assembly. OHIo CoNsr.
art. IV, § I. The constitution also outlines the jurisdiction of the constitutional courts and
specifies in some detail their composition and the manner of their functioning. Id. § 2-6.
However, neither the term "judicial power" nor the word "court" has ever been defined in
either of Ohio's constitutions. The determination of what the "judicial power" entails has been
left to the judiciary itself, and Ohio's courts have bridged the great interstices of their own
constitutional grant of power through resort to the common law. Relying on the common-law
conception of "judicial power," Ohio courts have found themselves to be constitutionally
clothed with an array of inherent common-law powers. See, e.g., State v. Coulter, Wright 421
(1833); Hale v. State, 55 Ohio St. 210, 45 N.E. 199 (1896) (power of court to punish for
contempt); In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. 492, 89 N.E. 39 (1909) (jurisdiction to disbar an
attorney); State ex rel. Weinberger v. Miller, 87 Ohio St. 12, 99 N.E. 1078 (1912) (inherent
right and duty to overturn unconstitutional legislation). On at least two occasions, the supreme
court has recognized as inherent the right of courts to promulgate rules governing their own
procedure. Meyer v. Brinsky, 129 Ohio St. 371, 195 N.E. 702 (1935); Cleveland Ry. v. Halliday,
127 Ohio St. 278, 188 N.E. 1 (1933). See also Gertner, The Inherent Power of Courts to Make
Rules, 10 U. CIN. L. REv. 32, 51-53 (1936); Comment, The Rule-Making Power of Ohio Courts
I OHIO ST. L.J. 123 (1935). The rule-making power has since been expressly recognized in the
constitution. OHIO CoNsr. art. IV, § 5(b). Central to the conclusions in the cases referred to
above was a conviction that certain incidents-powers and duties-naturally attach to a tri-
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The same reasoning would seem to apply with like force to the
constitutional creation of the office of attorney general. By providing
for the election of an officer denominated the "attorney general," the
framers of Ohio's constitution logically intended that the office
thereby established be charged with the duties and possessed of the
authority that had been engrafted to the identically named position
throughout preceding centuries. As stated by the United States Su-
preme Court with reference to creation of the United States Attorney
General:
The judiciary act of 1789, in its third section, which first created the
office of Attorney General, without any very accurate definition of
his powers . . . must have had reference to the similar office with
the same designation existing under the English law. And though it
has been said that there is no common law of the United States, it
is still quite true that when acts of congress use words which are
familiar in the law of England, they are supposed to be used with
reference to their meaning in that law. 3
The courts of other jurisdictions have also endorsed this approach to
determining the inherent characteristics of attorneys general. 4 There-
fore, just as the contempt power "arose upon the creation of a court
because it was implied in every conception of a court,"" it is sensible
to conclude that the attorney general of Ohio is granted, through the
constitutional recognition of his office, the functions "implied in
every conception of" an attorney general under common law and
custom.
C. The Absence of "Prescribed by Law" or Similar Qualifying
Phrases
In the majority of American jurisdictions, constitutional provi-
sions creating the office of state attorney general conclude with lan-
guage indicating that the functions of those officers are to be such as
bunal designated a court. Briefly stated, these decisions reflect a belief that the framers of the
constitution in 1851 used the language "judicial power" and "court" as a readily understanda-
ble shorthand whose referent is the common law. In Hale v. State. supra, the court succinctly
demonstrated the reasoning upon which this belief is premised:
When constitutional governments were established upon this continent there was
general familiarity with the course of judicial proceedings in the administration of
the common law. This power [of contempt] had long been exercised by courts as
inherent. It was within every conception of a judicial court.
55 Ohio St. at 213. 45 N.E. at 200 (emphasis added).
" United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273, 280 (1888).
" See, e.g., Kennington-Saenger Theatres v. State ex rel. Dist. Att'y, 196 Miss. 841, 865-
66, 18 So. 2d 483, 486 (1944): Van Riper v. Jenkins, 140 N.J. Eq. 99, 102, 45 A.2d 844, 845
(1946); Gibson v. Kay, 68 Ore. 589, 594, 137 P. 864, 866 (1914).
" Hale v. State, 55 Ohio St. 210, 213-14, 45 N.E. 199, 200 (1896).
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are "prescribed by law." Language of this type has been diversely
construed to contemplate assignment of powers and duties to attor-
neys general by legislative enactments only, by the postulates of the
common law subject to statutory alteration, and, in the case of Illi-
nois, by the teaching of the common law and consistent amendatory
legislation.6 It is perhaps, then, significant that article II1, § I of
Ohio's constitution contains no kindred qualifying terminology with
respect to the office of attorney general.
In Ohio, constitutional phraseology such as "prescribed by law,"
"provided by law," "established by law" and similar forms of words
have invariably been held by the courts to render the provisions that
they modify non-self-executing. Such terms are seen to connote a
purely prospective thrust, signalling the general assembly that it may
enact legislation regulating or effectuating the subject of the constitu-
tional provision in which the language is incorporated. 7 Examples of
such holdings abound in Ohio case law.18
It is, therefore, clear that the framers of the constitution of 1851
erected no legislative barriers to the election of an attorney general
in Ohio: under article III, § 1, no room is left for the General Assem-
bly to regulate whether an attorney general will take office. Presuma-
bly there is also no extra constitutional condition precedent to the
commencement of the performance by the attorney general of the
duties of his office.69 And since those duties are not expressly de-
scribed in the text of the constitution, it is inferable that the framers
"1 See, e.g., Fergus v. Russel, 270 Ill. 304, 110 N.E. 130 (1915); State ex rel. McKittrick
v. Missouri Pub. Serv. Comm., 352 Mo. 29, 175 S.W.2d 857 (1944); Shute v. Frohmiller, 53
Ariz. 483, 90 P.2d 998 (1939).
" This phenomenon is most dramatically exemplified by the decisional history of OHIo
CONST. art. I, § 16, which relegates the state amenable to suits "in such courts and in such
manner, as may be provided by law." The quoted language of article !, § 16 spawned a plethora
of unavailing efforts by private litigants to convince the courts that the state was constitution-
ally susceptible to suit. In each succeeding case, the supreme court held that the qualifying
"provided by law" indicated that legislative action would be required to implement the waiver
of immunity. See, e.g., Thacker v. Board of Trustees, 35 Ohio St. 2d 49, 298N.E.2d 542 (1973);
Krause v. State, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 285 N.E.2d 736 (1972). The General Assembly exercised
the option of article 1, § 16 and expressly waived the sovereign immunity of the state by passing
the Court of Claims Act, Act of June 4, 1974, 135 Ohio Laws 869 (codified at OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2743.01-.20 (Page Supp. 1975).
" Despite recognition of a presumption that Ohio constitutional provisions are intended
to be self-executing, see State ex rel. Russell v. Bliss, 156 Ohio St. 147, 101 N.E.2d 289 (195 1).
the supreme court has consistently found qualifying phrases similar to "prescribed by law" to
embody permissive signals to the General Assembly. See, e.g., Dubyak v. Kovach, 164 Ohio
St. 247, 129 N.E.2d 209 (1955) (construing OHIO CONST. art. II, § I ("provided by law")):
CoNsT. art. XII, § 2 ("directed by law")); Murray v. State ex rel. Nestor, 91 Ohio St. 220,
110 N.E. 471 (1915) (construing OHIO CoNsT. art. XVIII, § I ("regulated by law")).
" Cf. OHIO CONST. art. III, § 19.
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intended the attorney general to exercise the same amalgam of pow-
ers that traditionally devolved upon the office at common law. 71 Such
reasoning has typically been judically embraced in other states that
feature "mere" constitutional establishment of the office of attorney
general. 7' Hence, the express constitutional creation of the office of
attorney general, when coupled with the evident circumstance that the
framers perceived no need to otherwise outline or even allude to the
nature of that officer's functions, irresistably favors the conclusion
that the article III, § I attorney general is an officer of broad
common-law dimensions.
III. JUDICIAL DETERMINATIONS OF THE SCOPE OF ATTORNEY
GENERAL POWER
One seeking a thorough judicial exegesis of the office of attorney
general of Ohio and its attendant powers and duties will meet only
frustration and disappointment since there is a dearth of decisional
law addressing the issue. Definitive judicial resolution of the incidents
of the office of attorney general in Ohio has been obviated by several
interrelated factors. The foremost reason is that the General Assem-
bly from 1852 to the present has explicitly authorized the attorney
general to act in a quite extensive range of circumstances. 2 Ohio
statutes concerning the functions of the attorney general have always
countenanced in express terms nearly the entire spectrum of activities
that were undertaken by attorneys general at common law, thereby
greatly reducing the immediacy of the question whether authority
11 Of course, itmust be conceded that the attorney general is superficially indistinguishable
from the other major executive officers of the state-the offices of Governor, Lieutenant
Governor, secretary of state, treasurer, auditor, and attorney general being recognized literally
in a single breath in article II, § I-with respect to the absence of any explicit constitutional
manifestation that the charter of his office is to be entirely contingent upon the exercise of
legislative grace. However, the attorney general may be materially differentiated from these
other officers. Unlike the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and secretary of state, the attorney
general is not a recipient of specific powers and duties from the text of article Ill. In contradis-
tinction to the treasurer and auditor, the attorney general was not recognized in the constitu-
tion of 1802 and thus did not have the core of his governmental role delineated in longstanding
prior Ohio experience. Most importantly, the label "attorney general," but not the titles of
other constitutional state executive officers, benefited from an extensive and well known
common law heritage.
7' See. e.g., Darling Apartment Co. v. Springer, 25 Del. Ch. 420, 22 A.2d 397 (1941);
Howard v. Cook, 59 Idaho 391, 83 P.2d 208 (1938); State v. Finch, 128 Kan. 665, 280 P. 910
(1929): Commonwealth v. Kozlowsky, 238 Mass. 379, 131 N.E. 207 (1921); State ex rel. Young
v. Robinson, 101 Minn. 277, 112 N.W. 269 (1907); Van Riper v. Jenkins. 140 N.J. Eq. 99, 45
A.2d 844 (1946); Commonwealth ex rel. Minerd v. Margiotti, 325 Pa. 17, 188 A. 524 (1936).
But see State v. Davidson, 33 N.M. 664, 275 P. 373 (1929); Cosson v. Bradshaw, 160 Iowa
296, 141 N.W. 1062 (1913).
12 See generally notes 132-50 infra and accompanying text.
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inheres in the office of attorney general simply by virtue of its consti-
tutional station. In view of the broad attorney general powers that
have been statutorily recognized, invocation of inherent common-law
power could occur in only a rather limited number of situations.
Furthermore, Ohio's attorneys general have characteristically
been content to occupy a restricted role in Ohio government, dis-
charging the more prominent duties associated with the office, but
infrequently demonstrating innovative zeal in the prosecution of the
public's legal business. 73 Because of this conservative approach to the
discharge of the office, the question whether the Ohio attorney gen-
eral might fully enjoy the fruits of his common law heritage has
seldom been squarely presented for judicial determination. Moreo-
ver, it appears that in some situations in which that question might
appropriately have been addressed the issue was neither raised by the
litigants nor considered by the courts.74
A. Early Statutory Construction Cases: Inconclusive Dicta
Concerning the Attorney General's Constitutional Powers
Of the reported instances of litigation involving the array of
powers available to the attorney general, nearly all have been dis-
posed of on purely statutory grounds. Ohio courts have ruled ad-
versely to the existence of statutory attorney general power in several
cases.75 Ordinarily such a judicial decision, if not accompanied by a
further consideration of whether the type of authority in question
attaches to the attorney general as an incident of his common-law
heritage, might be taken as a tacit acknowledgment that the Attorney
General is devoid of extrastatutory power. However, an inference of
that nature may not be drawn from the decisions in which Ohio's
attorney general has been found wanting in power; because of the
contexts in which those cases arose, the decisions carry no implicit
refutation of the existence of common-law attorney general author-
ity .76
73 But see State ex rel. Watson v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137, 30 N.E. 279 (1892):
State v. Vanderbilt, 37 Ohio St. 591 (1882). These cases involved the imaginative use of the
attorney general's statutory quo warranto power as a tool for thwarting anticompetitive busi-
ness combinations. It is not clear whether the restraint with which the office of attorney general
has typically been conducted in Ohio was predicated by the officeholders' lack of fervor and
imagination, their belief that the office is entirely dependent upon the legislature for guidance
and initiative, or simply their understandable susceptibility to the practical constraints resulting
from finite resource allocation.
11 See, e.g.. State v. Lucas, 85 N.E.2d 154 (Ohio C.P. Franklin Cty.1949).
Is E.g., Lynch v. Board of Educ., 116 Ohio St. 361,156 N.E. 188 (1927): O'Neill v. Mutual
Tool & Die, Inc., 138 N.E.2d 681 (Ohio C.P. Montgomery Cty. 1956).
16 For example, in Lynch v. Board of Educ., 116 Ohio St. 361, 156 N.E. 188 (1927). the
Supreme Court of Ohio declined the request of the attorney general for vacation of a judgment
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In a greater number of cases the courts of Ohio have rejected
challenges to the statutory power of the attorney general. The most
that can be said of the majority of these cases is that the courts,
without extended discussion of the matter, credited the attorney
general with greater independence and discretionary latitude than
unambiguously emanated from the faces of the various statutes in-
volved.77 A number of other decisions have featured statements which
earlier rendered against the school board of Lakewood, Ohio. The Lakewood city solicitor,
acting on behalf of the school board, had initiated a lawsuit against a former school official,
Lynch, for a sum which allegedly had been wrongfully paid to the defendant. An Ohio statute
directed that any city official filing an action for recovery of unlawfully expended public funds
notify the attorney general of the commencement of the suit. The statute further expressly
provided that the attorney general be permitted to appear in the actual litigation of such a
lawsuit. The Lakewood solicitor failed to adequately apprise the attorney general of the action
brought against Lynch, and, therefore, the attorney general was deprived of the opportunity to
actively participate in the litigation. The suit proceeded to judgment, with the school board
failing to establish the merit of its claim for relief. Instead, Lynch, who had filed a counter-
claim, garnered an award of damages, and the judgment was thereafter satisfied by the school
board.
The attorney general subsequently challenged the validity of the proceedings, contending
that the solicitor's breach of statutory duty vitiated the trial court's jurisdiction of the matter
and rendered the judgment a nullity. The attorney general asserted that the pertinent legislation
created a "mandatory duty devolving upon his office to participate in all such actions relating
to suits to recover, whether the expenditures are from the state treasury or from political
subdivisions of the state, that no case can proceed to final judgment without an entry first being
submitted to him, and that, unless such entry is so submitted, the judgment is void." 116 Ohio
St. at 367, 156 N.E. at 190. The supreme court characterized the issue presented for decision
as the nature of the attorney general's statutory "duty in regard to actions relating to expendi-
tures which were not of public money from the state treasury." Id. The court then concluded
that, respecting the attorney general, the statute was only "directory" and "permissive" and
that, consequently, there had been no defect in the trial court's jurisdiction. Id. at 368, 156 N.E.
at 190. Consequently, the earlier judgment was allowed to stand, the city solicitor's dereliction
notwithstanding.
The Lynch decision was not inconsistent with the attorney general's possession of broad
inherent authority. Because the court viewed the underlying dispute between the school board
and Lynch as a matter of predominantly municipal significance, the court's construction of the
statute did not result in a narrower view of attorney general authority than existed at common
law. The supreme court reasoned that, since only local funds were involved, the attorney
general's active participation in the litigation was not a jurisdictional requisite. Id. at 369-70,
156 N.E. at 190. Furthermore, the court's decision was obviously impelled in large measure
by the salutary value of repose, since the supreme court accentuated the fact that "the judgment
was voluntarily paid by the board of education months before the Attorney General knew of
the same and before the Attorney General filed any proceedings to vacate the judgment." Id.
at 371, 156 N.E. at 191.
11 In State ex rel. Kohler v. Anderson, 45 Ohio St. 196, 12 N.E. 656 (1887), an original
action in quo warranto in the supreme court, the attorney general had filed the action on his
own relation for the ouster from office of the city council president of Urbana, Ohio. The
defendant demurred, arguing that the statutes governing quo warranto actions did not confer
upon the attorney general the right to institute such an action on his own initiative against a
public officer, and it was arguable that the statutes did not in fact decisively authorize the
action. See OHIo REv. STATUTES §§ 6762, 6763 (Smith and Benedict 1893). Nevertheless, the
supreme court perfunctorily discounted the defendant's objection. Disdaining the linguistic
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arguably reflect an expansive judicial perception of attorney general
authority. 8 Such statutory construction cases, of course, do not bear
directly upon the existence of inherent common law powers in the
hands of Ohio's attorney general. But, when synthesized, these cases
furnish support for the view that the attorney general is something
more than an officer who merely derives his stature and functions
from the General Assembly.
The most notable nineteenth century case concerning the author-
ity of the attorney general in Ohio is State ex rel. Little v. Dayton &
Southeastern Railroad." The supreme court there upheld an exercise
of power by the attorney general on grounds that were nomically
statutory. The attorney general had brought suit for injunctive relief
against the railroad, alleging that the latter "was obstructing a public
county road."80 The court found that the defendant's operations con-
stituted a public nuisance. It then proceeded to determine that, pur-
suant to statute, "the attorney general was fully authorized to main-
tain the action."'" Though this result may seem rather unremarkable,
the decision is noteworthy in several respects. First, the court's rea-
soning was based exclusively on common law precedent. As the court
noted: "[T]hat the attorney general was to institute such suits in
behalf of the public is abundantly shown by the authorities." It sup-
ported this statement by citing common-law authorities, including
English case law. 2 Next, the court observed that a common-law at-
torney general could bring such an action on his own relation and,
escapades that usually accompany statutory construction, the court simply stated that it was
"quite obvious" the attorney general could bring the action. The supreme court has spurned
other nonfrivolous challenges to attorney general authority with similar dispatch. See State ex
tel. Duffy v. Ferguson, 132 Ohio St. 524, 9 N.E.2d 290 (1937); State ex rel. Walton v. Crabbe,
109 Ohio St. 2d 623, 143 N.E. 189 (1924); State v. Newton, 26 Ohio St. 200 (1876). See also
State ex rel. Wasson v. Taylor, 50 Ohio St. 120, 38 N.E.24 (1893): Thompson v. Watson. 48
Ohio St. 552, 31 N.E. 742 (1891).
" For example, in State ex rel. Crabbe v. Plumb, 116 Ohio St. 428, 156 N.E. 457 (1927),
the supreme court declared without reference to any legislation "that the Attorney General,
being the chief law officer of the state and all the departments thereof, has authority to institute
an action in mandamus against a public officer to require him to discharge a duty placed upon
him by a mandatory statute. ... Id. at 429, 156 N.E. at 458. Another court issued a dictum
that "[any state official ordinarily may call upon the Attorney General to represent him and
the Attorney General will so do, when in the exercise of his discretion he determines that right
and justice are with the official." Dickinson v. Hot Mixed Bituminous Indus.. 58 N.E.2d 78.
86 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943). In State ex tel. S. Monroe & Son Co. v. Baker. 112 Ohio St. 356,
364, 147 N.E. 501, 504 (1925), Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the court, declared that "all
. . . executive officers of the state government. . . have powers and authority which have been
conferred by the Constitution and by the Legislature, and each is independent of the other."
Id. at 371, 147 N.E. at 505-06.
" 36 Ohio St. 434 (1881).
Id. at 435.
, Id. at 440.
2 Id.
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without more, stated that Ohio's attorney general could thus do the
same." Therefore, though purporting to engage in application of a
statute, the court looked solely to the common law for direction and
made not even the slightest mention of such niceties as exploration
of legislative intent or principles of statutory construction. Finally,
the court held that the attorney general's right of action in this area
remained unimpaired by the General Assembly's enactment of a pro-
vision authorizing county commissioners to seek damage awards
from entities obstructing county roads. The court "regard [ed] the act
as merely cumulative, and not as in anyway affecting the right of the
State to maintain the present action, ' 4 thus indicating that, at the
least, the attorney general's power had not been impliedly abrogated
by the legislature.15
An Ohio trial court subsequently found no merit in a defendant's
protestations that the attorney general could not maintain an action
to prevent the occurrence of a public nuisance. In State ex rel. Sheets
v. Hobart,'8 the attorney general had petitioned the court to enjoin
an impending prize fight. The court first concluded that the staging
of the event would be detrimental to the moral character of the
citizenry and, as such, prophylactic action was a matter of interest
to the state.87 Having done so, the court had little difficulty in then
determining that the attorney general possessed standing to seek judi-
cial preclusion of the upcoming contest. Prefatory to a discussion of
numerous decisions rendered by the courts of England and other
American jurisdictions, the court declared that "the court is not
driven to the necessity of making a precedent, as will hereafter ap-
pear. That the state through its attorney general can maintain an
action in equity to enjoin a public nuisance is well settled." 8 Conced-
edly, the court did thereafter quote from an Ohio statute as reflective
of the attorney general's standing, but this statutory reference ap-
11 When the suit did not immediately concern the rights of the crown or government,
its officers depended on the relation of some person, whose name was inserted in the
information as the relator. A relator, however, in such cases was by no means
indispensable; and the attorney general might, if he chose, proceed in the suit without
one.
Id. Therefore, ruled the court, "it was competent for the attorney-general to institute the suit
without a relator." Id.
' Id. at 442.
But cf State ex rel. Brown v. Rockside Reclamation, Inc., 47 Ohio St. 2d 76, 351
N.E.2d 448 (1976) (power of attorney general to contest operation of landfill under general
nusiance statute abrogated by enactment of special solid waste disposal statute). See notes 107-
17 infra and accompanying text.
's 8 Ohio N.P. 246 (C.P. Hamilton Cty. 1901).
" Id. at 264-66.
Id. at 270.
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pears to have been proffered merely to bolster the foregoing conclu-
sion that the action was properly brought by the attorney general."
It is inferable from the various decisions discussed heretofore
that Ohio courts recognized-but did not perceive a necessity to
unequivocally explicate-that the attorney general created by the
constitution of 1851 is not an official intended to procure his author-
ity only through the beneficence of the legislature. Indeed, as early
as 1876, the Supreme Court of Ohio, discussing the 1852 attorney
general legislation, had rather obliquely acknowledged the import-
ance of the elevation of the office to constitutional 'heights:
The office of attorney general was first created in 1846 . . . The
office of attorney general, by the present constitution, is made a
constitutional office; and the present act in relation to it, which was
passed since the adoption of the constitution, merely prescribes the
duties of the office.90
The significance of the attorney general's constitutional genesis
and the vital distinction between the Attorney General and purely
statutory public officers were to be more carefully explained by the
supreme court nearly half a century later. In State ex rel. Doerfler v.
Price9 a county prosecutor had brought an action in quo warranto
against the attorney general, seeking a determination that the attor-
ney general could not within the bounds of Ohio's constitution order
the impanelment of a special grand jury by a court of common pleas.
Specifically, it was the plaintiff's assertion that the attorney general,
by commanding that a special grand jury be seated, had usurped a
prerogative of county government-of the county prosecutor in par-
ticular-and that such a tactic was an encroachment upon govern-
mental power constitutionally reserved for exercise by local officials.
Since the General Assembly had explicitly empowered the attorney
general to take such action,92 the dispute did not require that the court
squarely confront the question whether specific common-law powers
inhere in the office of attorney general, and the court did not directly
11 The court did not state that the statute was applicable. Indeed, the provision quoted was
plainly not dispositive of the controversy before the court. The statute simply authorized the
attorney general's appearance in court on behalf of the state "[wlhen required by the governor
or general assembly." Id. at 271 (quoting OHIo REV. STATUTES § 202 (Smith and Benedict
1893)). The Attorney General had instituted the suit on his own initiative. In another piece of
litigation an Ohio trial court declared that, "[ilt having been determined that the state is the
party beneficially interested in this suit, the Attorney General, in the opinion of the court, was
a proper officer to prosecute the action in the name of the state." State ex rel. Monnett v. Board
of County Comm'rs, 4 Ohio N.P. 177, 180 (C.P. Preble Cty. 1899).
', State v. Newton, 26 Ohio St. 200, 205 (1876).
, 101 Ohio St. 50, 128 N.E. 173 (1920).
32 See id. at 52, 128 N.E. at 173-74.
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address that issue. The decision is nonetheless most enlightening be-
cause of the language and reasoning employed by the court in uphold-
ing the constitutionality of the pertinent statute.
The court began its analysis of the probelm before it by
acknowledging the constitutional status of the office of attorney gen-
eral and declaring that the attorney general draws authority from
both legislative enactments and the constitution itself:
[I]t will be helpful to see what the state constitution says about the
attorney general . . .. [T]he attorney general of Ohio is a constitu-
tional officer of the state, in the executive department thereof,
chargeable with such duties as usually pertain to an attorney
general, and especially with those delegated to him by the general
assembly of Ohio, exactly as duties are delegated to the other execu-
tive officers of the state .. ..
The court thus recognized that the sparse language of article III, § I
was augmented by the traditional common law notions associated
with the term "attorney general."
The court further accentuated the importance of the attorney
general's constitutional genesis by noting that, in contrast, the county
prosecutor is a creature of legislative origin who "exists only by virtue
of the favor of the general assembly."9 Succinctly elucidating the
crucial difference between the attorney general and county prosecu-
tors the court said:
[Tihe prosecuting attorney of a county. . . is not a constitutional
officer . . . .The general assembly of Ohio that passed the act
providing for the prosecuting attorney for each county may tomor-
row abolish the office and create a new one, or entirely change the
duties of the office.95
The precise holding of the court was that the constitution does not
proscribe the impanelment of a special grand jury by order of the
attorney general in accordance with statutory conferral of the power
to do so. Despite the narrow guage of the holding, however, Doerfler
strongly supports the proposition that some quantum of attorney
general authority emanates ipso facto from the recognition of that
office in the constitution.
,3 Id. at 57, 128 N.E. at 175 (emphasis added) (citing OHIO CONST. art. IIl, § 51).
04 Id. at 57, 128 N.E. at 175.
,1 Id. The court also observed that counties are "subordinate to the state in the exercise
of governmental power, and especially in the exercise of the police power." Id. See generally
State ex rel. Arey v. Sherrill, 142 Ohio St. 574, 53 N.E.2d 501 (1944).
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B. Recent Cases Acknowledging the Attorney General's Inherent
Authority to Safeguard the Public Interest
During the past decade or so, attorney general activity has
increased tremendously, due both to the expansion of the office's
statutory authority" and to a more frequent invocation of inherent
common law power for the protection of the public interest. Gener-
ally this extrastatutory authority has not been challenged and Ohio
courts have silently acquiesced in its exercise. However, in two recent
Ohio cases the issue whether the attorney general possesses inherent
common law powers was expressly joined.
In the first case, State ex rel. Brown v. BASF Wyandotte
Corp.,'7 the attorney general initiated an action to compel several
industrial firms to cease their alleged pollution of Lake Erie. The
defendants contested the propriety of the action on the ground that
the attorney general was without statutory authority to bring the suit.
Conceding the absence of explicit legislative delegation of power to
file the action, the plaintiff asserted that his right to represent the
interests of Ohio's citizenry stemmed from the historical status of the
attorney general as protector of the public interest. The trial court
agreed with the plaintiff, holding in an unpublished opinion that the
authority of the attorney general to abate a nuisance is "fundamental
and inherent in the office.""
In the second case, State ex rel. Brown v. Newport Concrete
Co.," the attorney general alleged that the defendant had created a
public nuisance by constructing a concrete causeway on the Little
Miami River that hampered the utility of that estuary to the public.
The court of appeals affirmed a summary judgment for the plaintiff,
rejecting the defendant's argument that the attorney general lacked
the power to initiate and maintain the action:
[W]e need merely to state that the Attorney General of Ohio is the
constitutional legal officer for the state, and the officer generally
relied upon to institute any necessary legal action to protect the
property rights of the state, and the rights of its citizens pertaining
to the use and enjoyment of such property...
It is quite natural, pursuant to the general constitutional and
" See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.51 (Page 1969). § 109.71 (Page Supp. 1975): §
3745.08 (Page Supp. 1975).
,1 No. 904,571 (Ohio C.P. Cuyahoga Cty. Feb. 22, 1974). The case had first been comm-
enced in the United States Supreme Court in 1970. but that Court declined to exercise its
original jurisdiction. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971).
"1 Memorandum of Opinion at 17, State ex rel. Brown v. BASF Wyandotte Corp.. No.
904,571 (Ohio C.P. Cuyahoga Cty. Feb. 22, 1974).
" 44 Ohio App. 2d 121, 336 N.E.2d 453 (1975).
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statutory powers of.the Attorney General of the state that his office
is the one which should exercise the rights of the state of Ohio as
they relate to the natural resources of the state, and the rights of
the citizens of this state to the continued free use of such resources
as are held in trust by our state.00
The court added that statutes prescribing certain actions by the
attorney general in the environmental protection area merely repre-
sent "legislative recognition" of that officer's essential role, inherent
in his constitutional station, as guardian of the public interest. 0'
The Supreme Court of Ohio has not yet expressly ruled that the
attorney general is constitutionally entitled to wield the full as-
sortment of powers developed by his common-law predecessor.
However, the seeds of such a holding may have been sown in that
court's opinion in State v. City of Bowling Green. °2 The state,
through the attorney general, had brought suit against the city of
Bowling Green, contending that the city's negligent operation of its
sewage treatment facility resulted in the destruction of Portage River
fish. The right of the attorney general to prosecute the action was not
challenged directly, the defendant instead contesting the standing of
the state. The court found that the state holds wildlife in trust for the
benefit of its citizens and held the action to be properly instituted,
saying:
We conclude that where the state is deemed to be the trustee of
property for the benefit of the public it has the obligation to bring
suit . . . to protect the corpus of the trust property ....
• . . The state's right to recover exists simply by virtue of the
public trust property interest which is protected by traditional
common law .... "
The supreme court thus quite lucidly affirmed the right and duty of
the state to protect the collective interests of its people and implicitly
recognized that the attorney general is the virtual embodiment of the
state for this purpose.
The same court's decision in Brown v. Buyer Corp.' also
deserves mention. The defendant in that charitable trust enforcement
case challenged the statutory authority of the Attorney General to
maintain the action. The supreme court held that the conduct of the
plaintiff attorney general was statutorily warranted," 5 but noted
11 Id. at 128-29, 336 N.E. 2d at 458.
M02 Id. at 129, 336 N.E.2d at 458. The court referred to Ohio Revised Code chapter 3745
as exemplary. Id. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3745.08 (Page Supp. 1975).
102 38 Ohio St. 2d 281, 313 N.E.2d 409 (1974).
I d. at 283, 313 NE.2d at 411.
"' 35 Ohio St. 2d 191, 299 N.E.2d 279 (1973).
"I Id. at 196, 299 N.E.2d at 282.
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that, had the issue of statutory application been decided otherwise, it
would turn to the common-law powers of the attorney general for
ultimate resolution of the dispute concerning that officer's role in the
litigation.101
Much of the foregoing discussion may seem to be of
questionable validity in light of the most recent reported decision
involving the assertion of attorney general authority, State ex rel.
Brown v. Rockside Reclamation, Inc.10 In Rockside, the attorney
general, acting on his own initiative, contested the allegedly unlawful
operation of a landfill facility. Rockside challenged the power of the
attorney general to prosecute the action absent a request by the
Director of the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency that suit be
brought. The Supreme Court of Ohio sustained the defendant's con-
tention and held that the litigation could not be maintained by the
attorney general under the circumstances. A casual reading of the
supreme court's Rockside opinion might indicate that an ample por-
tion of the attorney general's inherent power has been legislatively
retracted, but this impression is dispelled by a more careful analysis
of the court's decision.
Ohio's general nuisance statutes"'s comprised the purported basis
for the attorney general's action in Rockside. The defendant argued"0 9
that these general nuisance statutes had been partially superseded by
the enactment of more recent legislation governing the operation of
solid waste disposal facilities such as Rockside's landfill.110 The su-
preme court, adhering to the "well-established principle of statutory
construction that a subsequently enacted, specific statute takes pre-
cedence over earlier general legislation," ' decreed that landfill oper-
ations had been exempted from the ptlrview'of the general nuisance
statutes."2 Therefore, ruled the court, the attorney general had failed
to allege the creation of a nuisance by the defendant."3 There is no
suggestion in the Rockside opinion that the attorney general would
IN Because the statute was held to authorize the action, the court found it "unnecessary
to determine the extent of the common law powers of the Attorney General in dealing with
charitable trusts." Id.
'n 47 Ohio St. 2d 76, 351 N.E.2d 448 (1976).
' See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.13, 3767.32 (Page 1971).
"' See Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 11-18, State ex rel. Brown v. Rockside Reclama-
tion, Inc., 47 Ohio St. 2d 76, 351 N.E.2d 448 (1976).
" See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3734-.01-.99 (Page 1971 & Supp. 1975).
47 Ohio St. 2d at 83, 351 N.E.2d at 453.
2Id. at 78-83, 351 N.E.2d at 450-53.
"' The court stressed that Rockside was licensed to operate the landfill pursuant to OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.05 (Page Supp. 1975), and ruled that the general nuisance statutes
are "not applicable to a solid waste disposal operation licensed under R.C. Chapter 3734." 47
Ohio St.2d at 83, 351 N.E.2d at 453.
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be unable to contest the defendant's conduct were the solid waste
disposal legislation not operative to foreclose a cognizable nuisance
claim." 4
Under the solid waste disposal statute, "The Attorney General
.. . upon complaint of. . . the Director of Environmental Protec-
tion, shall prosecute to termination or bring an action for injunction"
against violators."5 The Rockside court interpreted this provision to
proscribe the initiation of legal action by the attorney general unless
he is so directed."' The fact that the supreme court embraced such a
constricted view of attorney general authority in this instance could
be perceived as an announcement that statutes commanding certain
attorney general action carry implicit prohibitions of extrastatutory
activity. Such a conclusion, however, would seem to be unwarranted.
The probable reason that the Rockside court narrowly construed the
statute in question was because that provision is but one facet of a
tightly-drawn statutory scheme, implementation of which is con-
signed to the province of administrative judgment and expertise. In-
deed, the supreme court emphasized that the Rockside litigation had
deviated from the mandatory pathways of administrative proce-
dure." 7 Seen in this context, Rockside represents a declaration of
exclusive primary jurisdiction rather than a comprehensive statement
regarding the authority of Ohio's attorney general.
In summary, although the character of attorney general power
has never been directly examined by the Supreme Court of Ohio, that
court has periodically intimated that there is a reservoir of powers
"I The analysis employed by the supreme court was purely statutory in nature. See id. at
78-83, 351 N.E.2d at 450-53. Nor did the parties present any discussion of the attorney general's
inherent power. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 28-45, Brief of Defendant-Appellee at I I-
33, State ex rel. Brown v. Rockside Reclamation, Inc., 47 Ohio St. 2d 76, 351 N.E.2d 448
(1976). The decision of the court of appeals from which the plaintiff appealed to the supreme
court was also narrowly grounded on legislative preemption with respect to solid waste disposal
facilities. See State ex rel. Brown v. Rockside Reclamation, Inc., 48 Ohio App. 2d 157, 166-
83, 356 N.E.2d 733, 739-47 (1975), affd, 47 Ohio St. 2d 76, 351 N.E.2d 448 (1976).
115 OMiO REv. CODE ANN. § 3734.10 (Page Supp. 1975).
' 47 Ohio St. 2d at 81, 351 N.E.2d at 451-52.
"' Rockside forcefully urged that the issues sought to be litigated by the attorney general
had been committed by the General Assembly to the process of administrative determination.
Therefore, postulated the defendant, the action of the attorney general was in circumvention
of prescribed administrative procedure, and the failure to pursue administrative relief precluded
adjudication of the dispute in Ohio's courts. See Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 33-50, State
ex rel. Brown v. Rockside Reclamation, Inc., 47 Ohio St. 76, 351 N.E.2d 448 (1976). This
approach obviously proved to be persuasive, for the supreme court stated:
[Tihe specific matter which the Attorney General now wishes to place immediately
and directly before this court has not been processed in accordance with the specific
requirements of both the Solid Waste Disposal Act (R.C. Chapter 3743) and the
Environmental Protection Agency Act (R. C. Chapter 3745).
47 Ohio St. 2d at 84, 351 N.E.2d at 453-54.
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and duties that inhere in the attorney general by virtue of his constitu-
tional status. In the past several years, the attorney general has ven-
tured outside the scope of functions expressly recognized by statute,
and the question whether the attorney general possesses inherent
common law attributes has been brought to the fore in litigation.
Ohio courts have generally responded to this question by holding that
the attorney general of Ohio is constitutionally conferred the indepen-
dent authority of the common-law attorney general concept.
IV. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
A. The Extent to Which the General Assembly May Regulate the
Functions of the Attorney General
Adherence to the view that the Ohio attorney general is constitu-
tionally vested with inherent common law authority does not mean
that the attorney general is entirely beyond the pale of legislative
regulation."1 It has always been supposed that the General Assembly
can exert some measure of control over Ohio's executive officials.
Conversely, it has also been recognized that, with respect to constitu-
tional executive officers, there are bounds beyond which legislative
circumscription of powers and duties will not be permitted. On one
occasion the supreme court characterized the residuum of guberna-
torial authority that is constitutionally immune from legislative im-
pingement as the "irreducible minimum.""' Because Ohio courts
have not spoken on the subject, the task of attempting to divine the
irreducible minimum of attorney general authority that is constitu-
tionally secured from legislative restrictions is fraught with the usual
pitfalls of speculative endeavor. However, some unavoidably impre-
cise conclusions can be drawn from a brief glance at Ohio decisional
law concerning constitutional power reposed in other state officials.
It is settled beyond question that enactments of the General
Assembly may not contravene the provisions of the constitution. This
fundamental maxim applies to constitutional delegations of author-
ity, both express and implied. As the supreme court has tersely but
M' With the exception of Illinois, see Fergus v. Russel, 270 111. 304, 110 N.E. 130 (1915),
there is unanimity among American jurisdictions that constitutional adoption of the common-
law attorney general concept does not preclude legislative regulation of state attorney general
powers and duties. See, e.g., State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Hallet, 88 Colo. 331, 296 P. 540 (1931);
Darling Apartment Co. v. Springer, 25 Del. Ch. 420, 22 A.2d 397 (1941); People v. Karalla,
35 Mich. App. 541, 192 N.W.2d 676 (1971); State ex rel. Meyer v. Peters, 188 Neb. 817, 199
N.W.2d 738 (1972); Van Riper v. Jenkins, 140 N.J. Eq. 99, 45 A.2d 844 (1946).
I State ex reL S. Monroe & Son v. Baker, 112 Ohio St. 356, 368, 147 N.E. 501, 505
(1925).
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cogently remarked, "[a] power which the legislature does not give,
it cannot take away."'' 0 It is thus tautological that the attorney
general's irreducible minimum is comprised of whatever powers and
duties are assigned his office by the constitution of 1851.
It is ordinarily true that no one possesses a vested right or inter-
est in continued adherence to the rules of the common law, because
common-law principles are usually subject to modification or abroga-
tion by the General Assembly.' 2' To this generalization must be an-
nexed the caveat that the legislature may not disturb a rule of the
common law that is expressly embraced by the constitution.2  And
when there appears in the constitution of Ohio a grant of explicitly
described authority to a particular official or agency, the General
Assembly is without the ability to attach restrictive conditions to the
exercise of that authority.
In adopting the common-law designation "attorney general,"
however, the framers of Ohio's constitution embodied in that docti-
ment neither a fixed rule of law nor a precise delegation of powers
and duties. Rather, the framers incorporated a common-law concept.
As with other constitutionally recognized historical institutions such
as courts and juries, the essential character of this concept was well
known, but its every facet could not and did not need to be meticu-
lously described. The common-law attorney general concept is read-
ily adaptable to emergent needs for governmental legal representa-
tion. Indeed, the growth of the office at common law was sparked
by its flexibility and the versatility of its holders. Moreover, measured
growth is the most attractive feature of the common law: Ohio jurists
have, in extolling the salutary aspects of the common-law tradition,
invariably accorded prime importance to the capacity of the common
law for adaptation in the face of changing circumstances.'2 Thus the
attorney general concept adopted by the constitutional framers was
comprised of a basic governmental role and its desirably fluid inci-
dents, rather than a static collection of detailed traits.
Similarly, article IV of the constitution does not explicitly as-
cribe certain characteristics to the courts. The designation "judicial
court," like that of "attorney general," denotes a status or role the
implications of which are not to be found in the unambiguous lan-
"' Hale v. State, 55 Ohio St. 210, 215, 45 N.E. 199, 200 (1896).
"2 Leis v. Cleveland Ry., 101 Ohio St. 162, 128 N.E. 73 (1920). See also Miller v. Fairley,
141 Ohio St. 327, 48 N.E.2d 217 (1943); George D. Harter Bank v. McKinley Lumber Co.,
136 Ohio St. 465, 26 N.E.2d 587 (1940).
"I See Fassig v. State, 95 Ohio St. 232, 248, 116 N.E. 104, 108 (1917).
'2 See, e.g., Fowler v. City of Cleveland, 100 Ohio St. 158, 169, 126 N.E. 72, 76 (1919):
Chilcote v. Hoffman, 97 Ohio St. 98, 101, 119 N.E. 364, 364 (1917); Flandermeyer v. Cooper,
85 Ohio St. 327, 337, 98 N.E. 102, 104 (1912).
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guage of any single document. The irreducible minimum of an Ohio
court is comprised of those elements which constitute it a court in the
traditional Anglo-American sense-the inherent powers and duties
without which it would not comport with "every conception of a
court."'' 2 While the General Assembly is free to regulate the imple-
mentation of the constitutional courts' inherent powers, that body
may not destroy such powers,'25 because to do so would render nuga-
tory the constitution's bestowal on those tribunals of the status of
judicial courts.
And so it is also with the attorney general of Ohio. The conclu-
sion is virtually irresistible that the attorney general as established
in Ohio's constitution is an officer whose description, in its particu-
lars, was not meant to be irrevocably tethered to any single point in
history or set of circumstances. Instead, the essential character of
that office-its irreducible minimum-consists of whatever basic
powers and duties are indispensable to the status of attorney general-
ship. In other words, the attorney general of Ohio is constitutionally
assigned the role of chief law officer of the state with primary respon-
sibility, and commensurate authority, for furnishing legal advice to
the government and serving as litigation respresentative for the state
and its citizens.
In most other jurisdictions courts have indicated that the
common-law powers of state attorneys general may be altered or
withdrawn by legislative mandate."' Although not articulated by
these courts, the rationale underlying such intimations must be that
the fluidity of the common-law attorney general concept was not
meant to be eviscerated by the constitutional recognition of the office.
This rationale is generally sound, but its logic should not apply in all
cases. Recognition and retention of the dynamic nature of the office
of attorney general is justifiable only within limits. Very specific types
of traditionally approved attorney general action need not be consid-
ered inviolable merely because the common-law attorney general
M, Hale v. State, 55 Ohio St. 210, 212, 45 N.E. 199, 200 (1896). See note 62 supra.
125 See Cincinnati Polyclinic v. Balch, 92 Ohio St. 101, 111 N.E. 159 (1915). The supreme
court has consistently decreed that the General Assembly may not forestall or impede the
exercise of inherent judicial powers. See, e.g., In re Nevius, 174 Ohio St. 560, 191 N.E.2d 166
(1963); State v. United Steelworkers Local 5760, 172 Ohio St. 75, 173 N.E.2d 331 (1961); State
ex rel. Turner v. Albin, 118 Ohio St. 527, 161 N.E. 792 (1928); In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St.
492, 89 N.E. 39 (1909); Hale v. State, 55 Ohio St. 210, 45 N.E. 199 (1896).
"I See, e.g., State ex rel. Carmichael v. Jones, 252 Ala. 479, 484, 41 So. 2d 280, 284
(1949); Pierce v. Superior Court, I Cal. 2d 759, 761-62, 37 P.2d 460, 461 (1934); State ex rel.
Landis v. Kress, 115 Fla. 189, 200, 155 So. 823, 827 (1934); State ex rel. Olsen v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 129 Mont. 106, 114, 283 P.2d 594, 598 (1955); State ex rel Maloney v. Wells, 79
S.D. 389, 399, 112 N.W.2d 601, 605 (1961). The sole exception is Illinois. See Fergus v. Russel,
270 III. 304, 110 N.E. 130 (1915).
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concept is elevated to a constitutional plane; on the other hand, as
was prudently observed in the Kentucky case of Johnson v. Common-
wealth ex rel. Meredith,tz7 acknowledgement of some legislative lee-
way respecting the functions of the office must not serve as a warrant
for statutory emasculation of a state attorney general constitutionally
cast in the mold of the common-law attorney general concept.
In summary, it is submitted that there is indeed an irreducible
minimum of authority inherent in the office of attorney general of
Ohio by virtue of article III, § 1. This core of authority is defined by
the traditional role of the attorney general as the lawyer of the gov-
ernment and the legal guardian of the public interests and by the
incidents necessary for the fulfillment of that role. The General As-
sembly may provide instruction for the attorney general or temper
his functions, but it may not deprive him of the authority inherent in
the traditional, constitutionally adopted status of the Attorney Gen-
eral as principal law officer. Any less nebulous description of the
irreducible minimum of attorney general authority must come from
the judiciary through case-by-case determination.
B. Conformity to the Common-Law Attorney General Concept in
Current Ohio Statutes Pertaining to the Functions of the Attorney
General
A review of extant Ohio statutes indicates that the General As-
sembly has not attempted to appreciably impede the exercise of tradi-
tional attorney general authority. Tle legislature instead appears to
have recognized the constitutional character of the attorney general:
it has accentuated certain of his specific common-law traits by ex-
press statutory provisions, wrought several subtle and relatively in-
nocuous inroads on his freedom of action, and assigned him specific
new functions in keeping with his constitutionally created role in state
government.
I. The Traditional Role as "Chief Law Officer"
The General Asembly appears to have recognized that Ohio's
'- 291 Ky. 809, 165 S.W.2d 820 (1942). The court recognized that the state legislature
might regulate the common-law powers of the Kentucky attorney general, but added:
[Tihe office may not be stripped of all duties and rights so as to leave it an empty
shell, for obviously, as the legislature cannot abolish the office directly, it cannot do
so indirectly by depriving the incumbent of all his substantial prerogatives or by
practically preventing him from discharging the substantial things appertaining to
the office.
Id. at 844, 165 S.W.2d at 829. The Supreme Court of Ohio has employed like reasoning with
regard to the constitutional role of the Governor. See State ex rel. Brown v. Ferguson, 32 Ohio
St. 2d 245, 291 N.E.2d 434 (1972).
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attorney general was cast in the mold of the common-law attorney
general concept. Indeed, were such an effort not rendered inconse-
quential by article III of Ohio's constitution, it could be credibly
contended that the attorney general is statutorily clothed with all the
traditional incidents of attorney generalship. The fundamental legis-
lative exposition of the attorney general's duties, Ohio Revised Code
§ 109.02, simply declares in relevant part:
The attorney general is the chief law officer for the state and all its
departments. . . . No state officer, board, or the head of a depart-
ment or institution of the state shall employ, or be represented by,
other counsel or attorneys at law. The attorney general shall appear
for the state in the trial and argument of all civil and criminal causes
in the supreme court in which the state is directly or indirectly
interested. When required by the governor or general assembly, he
shall appear for the state in any court or tribunal in a cause in which
the state is a party, or in which the state is directly interested. Upon
the written request of the governor, he shall prosecute any person
indicted for crime.12
This provision is seminal among the relevant legislation, and its lan-
guage is deserving of extensive consideration.
The use of the label "chief law officer" as a description of the
attorney general in § 109.02 is telling. Historically the term "chief law
officer" was synonymous with the common-law attorney general. As
has been seen, the "chief law officer" notion is the keystone of the
common-law attorney general concept: the old title "attorney
general" achieved its modern, enduring signification in the seven-
teenth century solely because the lawyer so denominated became
literally the chief law officer of the crown. In contemporary Ameri-
can usage the term "chief law officer" denotes the common-law at-
torney general concept and courts of other jurisdictions have so
gauged the import of that term's employment.1 2 Therefore, the ap-
"' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.02 (Page Supp. 1975).
"' Because of the historical identity of the term "chief law officer" and the common-law
attorney general concept, the former label has often been used to encapsulize the many powers
and duties associated with the traditional status of the attorney general. See, e.g., State ex rel.
Landis v. Kress, 115 Fla. 189, 200, 155 So. 823, 827 (1934); State v. Finch, 128 Kan. 665, 668,
280 P. 910, 913 (1929); State ex rel. Young v. Robinson, 101 Minn. 277, 288, 112 N.W. 269,
272 (1907). In re Equalization of Assessment of Natural Gas Pipelines, 123 Neb. 259, 261, 242
N.W. 609, 610 (1932). Moreover, the New Mexico rule that the state attorney general is without
broad inherent powers, see notes 31-35 supra and accompanying text, is partially grounded on
the circumstance that New Mexico district attorneys are assigned the role of "the law officer
of the state," under NEW MEXICO CONsT. art. VI, § 24. This factor was a key determinant of
the New Mexico Supreme Court's 1967 decision to reaffirm the holding of State v. Davidson,
33 N.M. 664, 275 P. 373 (1929). See State v. Reese, 78 N.M. 241, 243, 245, 430 P.2d 399,
401, 403 (1967).
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pearance of "chief law officer" in § 109.02 can sensibly be viewed as
indicative of the General Assembly's awareness that the attorney
general of Ohio possesses the attributes of the common-law attorney
general. 130
It is also worthy of comment that the attorney general is recog-
nized in § 109.02 as the chief law officer of both the state as a whole
and the multifarious components of state government. It will be re-
called that, at common law, the attorney general of England labored
on two divergent fronts. He was not only the principal legal represent-
ative of the government itself, but also prosecuted violations of the
rights of the collective populace. A kindred differentiation of govern-
mental legal work in the United States can be aptly drawn: with
respect to the legal business of a modern republican government, one
may validly distinguish between work generated by particular govern-
mental agencies charged with discrete areas of responsibility and
legal work whose performance is a matter of general governmental
and public interest. When cognizance is taken of this distinction, it
is exceedingly significant that the General Assembly has accepted
that the attorney general is chief law officer of the state-the princi-
pal legal representative of the public interest-in addition to his func-
tion as house counsel to each of the many separate arms of state
government.
Such a reading of § 109.02 is buttressed by the wording of a
subsequent statutory provision pertaining to the functions of the
attorney general which alludes to "all his common law and statutory
powers."' 3' This view also receives support from the remaining pro-
visions of § 109.02. These provisions specify that the attorney general
must represent the state in litigation, whether civil or criminal, that
is perceived by the Governor or General Assembly to be heavily
suffused with state interest. Furthermore, by commanding that the
attorney general appear in litigation in the supreme court in which
the state is indirectly interested, § 109.02 arguably attributes to
Ohio's attorney general a quality akin to the "superior standing"
118 Indeed, absent the adoption of the common-law attorney general concept in Ohio's
constitution, it could be creditably posited that the attorney general is statutorily assigned the
traditional attributes of the attorney generalship. Given the strength of Ohio's common-law
heritage, see notes 53-55 supra and accompanying text, § 109.02 standing alone would certainly
be susceptible to such an interpretation. In Oregon, where the office of attorney general is not
embodied in the state constitution, it has been held that the statutorily created attorney general
possesses common-law powers. See Gibson v. Kay, 68 Ore. 589, 137 P. 864 (1914).
"I Act of Jan. 9, 1961, 129 Ohio Laws 582 (amending OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 109.26).
This language was recently deleted by amendment of the provision. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 109.26 (Page Supp. 1975). However, the amendment also featured a declaration that the
powers therein ascribed to the attorney general are "in addition to and not in limitation of his
powers held at common law." Id. § 109.24 (Page Supp. 1975).
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which was bestowed upon his common-law predecessors. It is also
notable that the attorney general is therein recognized as the sole
legal counsel of the other agents of state government.
2. Specific Statutory Attributes
As was earlier stated, Ohio statutes have, from 1852 on, ex-
pressly authorized the attorney general to engage in a variety of
activities which, in the aggregate, substantially coincide with the un-
dertakings associated with common-law attorneys general. This char-
acterization of Ohio statutes pertaining to the functions of the
attorney general retains a large measure of accuracy today. A num-
ber of enactments presently in force expressly impose upon the attor-
ney general the duty to serve as governmental legal advisor.," Cur-
rent Ohio statutes also contain several unambiguous references to the
attorney general's litigative function."' Additional statutory provi-
sions supply the necessary incidents for the attorney general's execu-
tion of his office. He is statutorily empowered to appoint assistant
attorneys general,' special counsel,' and supportive personnel.,
1'2 As has been seen, § 109.02 unequivocally designates the attorney general the sole legal
counsel to the myriad elements of state government. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.02 (Page
Supp. 1975). Additional provisions designate the attorney general as legal advisor to certain
specific state agencies. See, e.g.. id. § 4901.17 (Page 1954) (Public Utilities Commission); §
5149.08 (Page 1970) (Adult Parole Authority); § 5505.23 (Page 1970) (State Highway Retire-
ment Board). Other presently operative Ohio statutes specify that the attorney general must
furnish requested legal advice to the General Assembly, id. § 109.13 (Page 1969) and to func-
tionaries of the executive branch, id. § 109.12. The attorney general is further directed by statute
to render assistance in the resolution of disputes concerning the title to certain lands in which
the state allegedly holds an interest, id. § 109.11 (Page Supp. 1975), and to assess the rights of
parties from whom the state might acquire an interest in real property, id § 109.121. Finally,
the attorney general is statutorily required, on the request of another state official, to "prepare
suitable forms of contracts, obligations, and other like instruments of writing for the use of
state officers." Id. § 109.15 (Page 1969). The attorney general is also commanded to draft forms
for local registration of land titles throughout the state. See id. § 5309.97 (Page 1970).
'2 Of course, § 109.02 expressly commands attorney general participation in the state's
litigation under certain circumstances and establishes that executive officers and agencies may
not be officially represented in court by any other counsel. Cf. Sowers v. Civil Rights Comm'n,
20 Ohio Misc. 115, 252 N.E.2d 463 (C.P. Trumbull Cty. 1969) (attorney general held legal
representative of Commission for all legal matters). In addition, the state may be defended only
by the attorney general in the court of claims, OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.14 (Page Supp.
1975), and it is mandated that the Attorney General represent certain state agents sued person-
ally as a result of their efforts on behalf of the state. Id. § 109.122. Present statutes also
authorize the attorney general to institute proceedings in quo warranto. Id. § 1331.11 (Page
1969). Furthermore, current statutes offer explicit recognition that the attorney general is the
appropriate person to safeguard the legal interests of the state and its citizens in ensuring the
efficient, lawful maintenance of public charities, id. §§ 109.23-.32 (Page Supp. 1975), arresting
and redresing unfairness in the marketplace, id. § 1345.07 and preventing the capricious
decimation or destruction of key environmental resources, id.
"' Id. § 109.03 (Page 1969).
'Id. § 109.07.
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Moreover, the discharge of his litigation duties is facilitated by the
express statutory creation of several procedural prerogatives that are
unavailable to other suitors.'37 Therefore, in summary, the specific
legislatively countenanced traits of Ohio's attorney general fully com-
port with the common-law attorney general concept.
In addition to generally recognizing the Attorney General's sta-
tus as the state's chief law officer and enacting measures that are
substantially declaratory of his common-law powers and duties, the
General Assembly has engrafted several additional functions to the
office of attorney general. These additional statutorily described
functions, though hardly amenable to characterization as inherent to
the office of attorney general, are nonetheless consonant with the
attorney general's essential role in state government. For example,
the General Assembly has made the attorney general a member of
several key governmental commissions and boards.3 8 Such grants of
membership to the attorney general are logical extensions of his in-
herent advisory function. The attorney general is thus enabled to
better supply timely legal advice germane to the operations of'those
commissions and boards on which he sits.
The General Assembly has also somewhat broadened the charter
of the attorney general with respect to litigation involving matters of
great public interest. Of course, the attorney general has always been
a proper official to appear in court on behalf of the state and its
government. But present statutes further authorize the attorney
general to represent parties other than the state in certain lawsuits.
The attorney general is, for example, permitted to serve as the lawyer
of political subdivisions in "antitrust cases and do all things necessary
to properly represent them in any such case under the laws of any
state or the federal government."' 39 The attorney general is also
empowered to appear on behalf of local governmental units in litiga-
tion concerning alleged unlawful disbursement or appropriation of
local public funds or property."' Although the effective prosecution
of these types of litigation is obviously of importance to the general
public and therefore an appropriate subject of concern by the state's
chief law officer, the attorney general might be unable to directly
participate in such cases when acting solely on behalf of the state
itself. '4 Therefore, the attorney general's ability to fulfill his inherent
' Id. § 109.05. See also id. § 109.33.
"n Id. §§ 109.10, 109.17-.20.
t See, e.g., id. § 129.01 (sinking fund); id. § 4503.36 (Page 1973) (Ohio Reciprocity
Board).
"I Id. § 109.81 (Page 1969).
"o See id. § 117.10.
"I See generally Lynch v. Board of Educ., 116 Ohio St. 361, 156 N.E. 188 (1927).
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duty to safeguard the legal interest of the people has been enhanced
in these instances by statutes that allow him to represent political
subdivisions.
Finally, the General Assembly has broadened the functions of
the attorney general by creating in his office two organizations de-
signed to upgrade the quality of criminal law enforcement throughout
the state: the Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation'4 2
and the Ohio Peace Officer Training Council.4 3 The first of the
entities is charged with compiling and disseminating all kinds of data
relevant to criminal investigations,' operating a "criminal analysis
laboratory,"'45 maintaining a staff of investigators and kindred per-
sonnel"' and promoting coordination of effort among the law en-
forcement agencies of the various levels of government.'47 The Bureau
of Criminal Identification and Investigation is also sweepingly au-
thorized to "engage in such other activities as will aid law enforce-
ment officers in solving crimes and controlling criminal activity."'4
The purpose of the Ohio Peace Officer Training Council is, as its
name implies, to assure the effective training of law enforcement
officers throughout the state. To accomlish this goal, the Council
may propose rules and regulations establishing minimum require-
ments for all "peace officer training schools" within Ohio.4 The
attorney general then, "in his discretion, may. . . adopt and promul-
gate any or all of the rules and regulations recommended by the...
council."'' 0 These new functions obviously comport well with the
attorney general's essential role as principal guardian of the legal
rights of the state and its collective constituents, the citizenry. Indeed,
such purely statutory functions should facilitate the attorney gen-
eral's efficient performance of his essential role in state government.
Thus the statutory conferral of such functions on the attorney general
is a further indication both that the General Assembly has been aware
of that officer's constitutional charter and that it has not endeavored
to deprive the attorney general of his inherent powers and duties.
3. The Attorney General and the Prosecuting Attorney
A review of the impact of legislation upon the attorney general
142 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.51 (Page 1969).
" Id. § 109.71 (Page Supp. 1975).
"' Id. § 109.57.
Iu d. § 109.52 (Page 1969).
Id.
"' See id. § 109.54 (Page Supp. 1975); § 109.55 (Page 1969); § 109.62 (Page 1969).
"' Id. § 109.52 (Page 1969).
" See id. § 109.73 (Page Supp. 1975).
" d. § 109.74 (Page 1969).
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of Ohio must include a consideration of the statutorily originated
office of prosecuting attorney. The office of prosecuting attorney is
a venerable one in Ohio, its initial establishment by the General
Assembly long predating the constitution of 1851.11 Today, as
throughout most of Ohio's history, it is statutorily provided that a
prosecuting attorney is to be elected by the voters of each county.,"
The charter conferred upon the prosecuting attorney by the General
Assembly is as follows:
The prosecuting attorney may inquire into the commission of
crimes within the county and shall prosecute, on behalf of the state,
all complaints, suits, and controversies in which the state is a party,
and such other suits, matters, and controversies as he is required to
prosecute within or outside the county, in the probate court, court
of common pleas, and court of appeals. In conjunction with the
attorney general, such prosecuting attorney shall prosecute cases
arising in his county in the supreme court . . .
It is first to be noted that the prosecuting attorney is an official
of purely local authority. Indeed, under article X, § 1 of Ohio's consti-
tution a legislatively created prosecuting attorney cannot wield any
power in matters not germane to the affairs of his own county.'54
Thus, although authorized to invoke the authority of the state in
litigation, a prosecuting attorney may do so only with respect to
transgressions that directly affect the citizens by whom he was
elected. 15
"' The office was first created soon after Ohio achieved statehood. See Act of April 15,
1803, § 25, 1 Ohio Laws 50. It was reestablished under the new constitution in 1852. See Act
of April 30, 1852, 50 Ohio Laws 215.
152 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 309.01 (Page 1953).
I ld. § 309.08.
' See OHIO CONT. art. X, § 1. See also State ex rel. Doerfler v. Price, 101 Ohio St. 50,
128 N.E. 173 (1920).
"I This rule was clearly laid down by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State ex rel. Finley
v. Lodwich, 137 Ohio St. 329, 29 N.E.2d 959 (1940). There, a prosecuting attorney had insti-
tuted proceedings in quo warranto to secure the ouster from office of a state official said to be
lacking in the legislatively prescribed prerequisites for appointment to the position that he
occupied. The defendant demurred, challenging the right of the prosecuting attorney to press
the claim. Although conceding that the prosecuting attorney was entitled by statute to initiate
proceedings in quo warranto, defendant Lodwich, represented by the attorney general, con-
tended that the prosecutor's petition was nonetheless fatally deficient because, despite alleging
an impropriety redressable by quo warranto, it portrayed no direct nexus between the purported
violation and the relator prosecuting attorney's home county. While constrained to assume that
the defendant was in fact unlawfully appointed to office, the supreme court sustained Lodwich's
demurrer and endorsed the attorney general's position that the prosecuting attorney's "duties
are confined to affairs within his own county, and that he is not authorized to challenge or
question the rights or powers of state officers in the absence of action or assertion of a right to
act within such county." Id. at 331, 29 N.E.2d at 960.
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It should also be noted that it is not inconsistent with the
common-law attorney general concept that a local officer is concur-
rently empowered to represent the state in the prosecution of litiga-
tion whose immediate significance is primarily local.'56 While the
attorney general is the chief law officer of the state, the various
prosecuting attorneys are also law officers who may represent the
state in their respective localities. Moreover, the legislative grant to
prosecuting attorneys of the authority to redress local civil or crimi-
nal affronts to the state is not incompatible with the simultaneous
residence in the attorney general of power to contest precisely the
same abuses. On the contrary, the conferral of litigative power on
local officials does not eviscerate the like power of the attorney
general as is demonstrated by both the express overlap of unambi-
guous satutes'57 and by judicial interpretation of more ambiguously
drafted enactments."'8 In other words, rather than relieving the
attorney general of his inherent function in state government, the
existence of the office of prosecuting attorney merely represents an
additional mechanism through which the state's legal interests may
be vindicated. 151
It is difficult to assess the interrelationship of the attorney
general and the prosecuting attorneys. Since the attorney general
possesses statewide authority and is explicitly denominated the state's
chief law officer, it might be presumed that the various prosecuting
attorneys were intended to labor as mere adjuncts of the attorney
general. On the other hand, it seems quite clear that the General
Assembly intended the prosecuting attorneys to function without the
continuous, direct supervision or interference of the attorney general.
The prosecuting attorney is charged with the handling of legal mat-
ters in which the state is neither a party nor significantly interested. 60
Moreover, much litigation which the prosecuting attorney might
conduct on behalf of the state as a nominal party is of no lasting
significance beyond the border of the county in which it arises. It
"I See generally Comment, The District Attorney-A Historical Puzzle, 1952 Wis. L.
REv. 125.
' See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 117.10 (Page 1969); § 1331.11 (Page 1962).
t See State ex rel. Little v. Dayton & S.E.R.R., 36 Ohio St. 434, 441-42 (1881).
' It has long been accepted doctrine in Ohio that modes of legal redress are presumed to
be cumulative. See, e.g., Bennett v. Fleming, 105 Ohio St. 352, 137 N.E. 900 (1922); Zanesville
v. Fannon, 53 Ohio St. 605, 42 N.E. 703 (1895); Darst v. Phillips, 41 Ohio St. 514 (1885).
I" In addition to undertaking litigation in the name of the state, the prosecuting attorney
must attend to "such other suits, matters, and controversies as he is required to prosecute."
Ofno REv. CODE ANN. § 309.08 (Page 1953). The prosecuting attorney performs on a local
level many of the nonlitigative tasks that the attorney general discharges for state government.
See id. § 309.09 (Page Supp. 1975); § 309.11 (Page 1953).
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hence seems desirable that the operations of prosecuting attorneys
not be subjected to incessant intermeddling by a state official, and it
is likely that the General Assembly meant for the prosecuting attor-
neys to be free of excessive intervention by the attorney general.
Still, the attorney general is the principal law officer of the state,
and, as such, he naturally must bear some responsibility for the effi-
cient prosecution of all legal action undertaken on behalf of the state.
Ultimately the enforcement of the state's laws and protection of its
interests are matters of statewide importance, regardless of the con-
text in which disputes involving these matters arise.' Therefore, it
is not surprising to find that the General Assembly has recognized
the need for some interaction between the attorney general and the
prosecuting attorney. Each prosecuting attorney is statutorily re-
quired to annually apprise the attorney general in detail of his crimi-
nal prosecutorial activity6 ' and must also "furnish to the attorney
general any information he requires in the execution of his office,
whenever such information is requested by him."' Additionally, the
General Assembly has commanded that, on request, the attorney
general must counsel a prosecuting attorney with regard to any suit,
whether actual or prospective, involving the state.'64
To briefly recapitulate the significance of the office of prosecut-
ing attorney with respect to the role of the attorney general, it ap-
pears: that the prosecuting attorney, though empowered to represent
the state in litigation, may act on behalf of the state only insofar as
such action is predicated by the need to assure the protection of the
law to those by whom he is elected; that with regard to those matters
in which the prosecuting attorney can invoke the name and authority
of the state, he by no means enjoys a monopoly to the exclusion of
the attorney general; and that, as the vindication of the state's legal
rights is in the final analysis the concern of the sovereign itself, it is
the attorney general-constitutionally established and statutorily rec-
ognized as the chief law officer of the state-who must exercise ulti-
mate authority in the prosecution of litigation on behalf of the state.
Therefore, it is suggested that the prosecuting attorney is directed by
statute to conduct all litigation on behalf of the state that is directly
related to the affairs of his particular county, unless it is ordered by
higher authority that the prosecution of the matter be instead handled
by the attorney general. And such higher authority may be the Gover-
6I See generally State ex rel. Doerfler v. Price, 101 Ohio St. 50, 57-60, 128 N.E. 173, 175-
76 (1920).
162 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 309.15 (Page 1953).
16 Id.
"I Id. § 109.14 (Page 1969).
CONSTITUTIONAL CHARTER
nor,' the General Assembly 66 or perhaps the chief law officer him-
self., 67
VI. CONCLUSION
By the middle of the eighteenth century the title "attorney gen-
eral," through extended use in England and the American colonies,
had come to occupy an accepted signification in the lexicon of the
Anglo-American legal system. An official so designated was the chief
law officer of the sovereign, possessed of broad powers and corre-
sponding responsibility for effectuating the legal rights of the govern-
ment and the public. This nomenclature and its accompanying con-
ception were perpetuated by the fledgling United States following the
American Revolution. When the framers of Ohio's constitution of
1851 incorporated the office of attorney general in the state's execu-
tive department without textually describing the powers and duties
of that position, it is submitted they intended that Ohio's attorney
general would perform the same essential governmental role as his
common-law forebears. Therefore, Ohio's attorney general is con-
stitutionally chartered the principal legal counsel of the state, obliged
to pursue whatever course he determines to be necessary for the vin-
dication of the right of the public, and with ultimate accountability
only to the sovereign itself-the people. He is the present day person-
ification of the common-law attorney general concept.
The ramifications of the attorney general's constitutional charter
are profound. As the state's chief law officer the attorney general
need not-and certainly should not-merely await externally origi-
nated authorization to commence appropriate action while the public
endures unlawful abuses of its interests. Rather, the authority-and
the duty-to initiate such action inheres in the constitutional creation
of the attorney general's office. Only when the public interest is pro-
tected by a comprehensive regulatory scheme can the attorney gen-
eral be forced to defer the institution of litigation so that the agency
charged with administration of the scheme may exercise its exclusive
primary justification. 66
That Ohio's attorneys general have begun in recent years to
exploit the inherent authority of their office should be greeted with
guarded optimism. It is desirable that the chief law officer discharge
"I Id. § 109.02 (Page Supp. 1975).
1"9 Id.
"I Cf. id. § 4123.92 (Page 1973) (specifying that suits to recover funds due the state
workmen's compensation fund are to be brought either by the attorney general or by the local
prosecutor under the direction of the attorney general).
"' See text accompanying notes 115-17 supra.
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his constitutional role as prosecutor of the public interest more zeal-
ously than has traditionally been the case in Ohio. For example,
incipient problems in the areas of consumer protection,"9 environ-
mental quality7 " and criminal activity' can be far more expedi-
tiously addressed, at least in the first instance, through the proper
exercise of the attorney general's inherent authority than through the
often lengthy process of legislative action. On the other hand, the
broad power of the attorney general is subject to capricious or malev-
olent assertion. Of course, "The suggestion that this power may be
abused raises no doubt as to its existence,"7 2 but the potential for
detrimental action predicated by purely personal or political mo-
tives-or simply grounded on poor judgment-is an inevitable con-
comitant of the attorney general's constitutional charter. 17 3 In this
respect, the attorney general is no different from the Governor: each
officer is constitutionally vested with discretionary authority whose
exercise may significantly advance or severely retard the well-being
of the state and its people.
"I Compare Saxbe, The Role of the Government in Consumer Protection: The Consumer
Frauds and Crimes Section of the Office of the Ohio Attorney General. 29 OHIo ST. L.J. 897
(1968), with Note, The Role of the Michigan Attorney General in Consumer and Environmen-
tal Protection, 72 MIcH L. REV. 1030, 1040-44 (1974). See Comment, Commercial Nuisance:
A Theory of Consumer Protection, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 590 (1966). See also Note, Consumer
Protection By the State Attorneys General: A Time for Renewal, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 410
(1973).
I7 See generally Note, The Role of the Michigan Attorney General in Consumer and
Environmental Protection, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1030, 1045-46 (1974). The value of inherent
attorney general authority in this regard had been demonstrated in Ohio. See notes 97-103
supra and accompanying text.
"I The General Assembly has acknowledged that the attorney general is the public officer
best equipped to spearhead efforts to arrest "organized criminal activity." See OHIo REV.
CODE Ann. § 109.83 (Page Supp. 1975) (permitting investigation and prosecution of "organized
criminal activity" by the attorney general "[wihen directed by the governor or general assem-
bly"). In other jurisdictions, state attorneys general have invoked common-law powers in the
area of criminal prosecution. See generally DeLong, Powers and Duties of the State Attorney-
General in Criminal Prosecutions, 25 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 358 (1934).
,72 Hale v. State, 55 Ohio St. 210, 214, 45 N.E. 199, 200 (1896) (referring to the inherent
power of the judiciary to punish for contempt).
"I Even acting within the ambit of statutory authority, a state attorney general may,
through the exercise of legal judgment, substantially influence the workings of state govern-
ment. See Larson, The Importance and Value ofAttorney General Opinions, 41 IowA L. REv.
351 (1956); Toepfer, Some Legal Aspects of the Duty of the Attorney General to Advise. 19
U. CIN L. REv. 201 (1950). See also Abraham and Benedetti, The State Attorney General: A
Friend of the. Court?, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 795 (1969); Comment, An Attorney General's
Standing Before the Supreme Court to Attack the Constitutionality of Legislation, 26 U. CHI.
L. REV. 624 (1959).
